REFLECTIONS
ON THE ORIGINS AND INEQUALITIES OF FRAGMENTED REGIONALISM[1]
[1]
See H.V. Savitch and Sarin Adhikari (2016) “Fragmented Regionalism: Why Metropolitan America Continues to
Splinter” Urban Affairs Review and “Response
to Lidstrom, Lewis and Barnes”, Urban
Affairs Review
Some of our colleagues have commented that regional governance existed only in the minds of academics. We think that claim warrants correction, not only because it is mistaken but also because it does not appreciate broader impulses toward creating regional institutions. The fact is some regionalist roots can be found in non-governmental organizations and at all levels of government. These included the Council on Economic Development, the Regional Plan Association and the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (CED 1966; RPA 1980; ACIR 1974). The 1960s were fraught with national initiatives toward regionalism; particularly in the creation of Councils of Government (COGs) and Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs). Perhaps the most notable salutation to regionalism arrived when localities began to implement it, first in Miami (1956) then in Minneapolis (1967), and later in Portland (1979). For a while it seemed regionalism was emerging from the shadows.
By the 1980s this momentum came to a screeching halt. Hopes for regionalism were terminated by the
Reagan administration’s pull-back from city issues, though we can also see regionalism’s
limitations as much more entrenched. A number of structural factors were deeply
at work in stunting regional ambitions. These
were, political incentives for keeping local governments small and independent;
economic requirements for the development of highly specialized localities as separate
jurisdictions; and, the success of public authorities in threading the needle
between regional and local interests (eliminating the need for comprehensive
reform). Coupled to these factors were
racial motivations to keep out non-whites and a popular belief that local
matters were best managed at the local level.
While these factors preserved the status quo, the
usual patchwork of regional “kludges” kept metropolitan machines running. These included public authorities whose
primary missions were to care for roadways, airports and mass transit. For regional enthusiasts the real loss lay in
the absence of an institutional mechanism to mitigate socio-economic
inequalities and rejuvenate local economies.
Our critics might be right to protest that states are
well designed to fill this gap or that the federal bureaucracy is well equipped
to deal with these exigencies. And yet,
there are three reasons why those arguments should be tempered. The first is that without some kind of
regional multipurpose authority, localities will continue to proliferate,
pirate resources from each other and actually depress some job development. The second, is that fragmentation is linked
to inequalities both within and between jurisdictions (Hill 1974; Prud'homme
1995). And, the third is that “special districts”,
like public authorities, have an “upward spending bias” that greatly reinforces
inequalities (Foster 1997).
Our own findings verify these
propositions. Beginning with the first,
in some ways local fragmentation is a good thing. It maximizes residential choices for some households
and improves government performance and economic development for most other citizens. On the other hand, too much of something can
also be damaging. Fragmentation creates
walls between social classes and leads to the wealthiest jurisdictions gobbling
up positive externalities, while the poorest localities absorb negative
externalities and are isolated from any grip on the regional economy. The examples are abundant. Characteristically, affluent localities are
proximate to waterways, mountains, central business districts or major
transportation corridors. The poorest
localities often sit on unwanted land uses, garbage dumps, waste treatment
plants, halfway houses or drug clinics.
The second proposition is especially
compelling. The United States and most
other advanced economies are in a spiral of rising inequalities. Notwithstanding, the political rhetoric of
both political parties, the reasons for this are not due to “Wall Street”
conspiracies (claimed by Democrats) or governmental obstacles (claimed by Republicans). The major reasons for inequality have
everything to do with structural economic changes.
At the forefront of those inequalities is
a shift away from manufacture to a digital and service economy. Even as manufacture mildly resurges, new production
is governed by high tech equipment, robotics and three dimensional printing. Once abandoned factory buildings in Akron,
Pittsburgh and Detroit are now abuzz with new kinds of production lines and
knowledge industries. Add to this
globalization and its attendant promotion of free trade, corporate mobility and
easy migration and we can see why blue collar jobs are shrinking. All of this has made the days of $40 an hour
assemblers obsolete and creates deep cleavages in national income curves.
No amount of demagoguery by Bernie Sanders
or Donald Trump can restore those lost jobs. Nor can we find our way out of
inequality by redistributive policies in a nation where 60 percent of the
national budget is already committed to entitlements of one kind or another. We
can only exit this crisis by developing our way out of it. What is required is continued modernization
of our economy, a reconstruction of our infrastructure and a strongly
competitive international trading posture.
This brings us to our third
proposition. While public authorities
have contributed to regional imbalances, they are capable of reversing that
course of investment. More than
anything, public authorities are institutional tools for development, which
thus far have followed lucrative markets and high capacity metropolises. There are however other frontiers in need of
regional public authorities. Worn out rustbelt
and legacy cities are perfect locales for renewing old ports, refashioning old
railway systems and rebuilding old urban cores. Imagine, adding a dollar in
additional taxes to each purchased gallon of gasoline; then devoting that additional
revenue toward building smart electrical grids and burying scraggily utility
lines where they can be shielded from storms and blackouts. Infrastructure construction is what public
authorities do best and they have a record to prove it. Here is a job that is waiting to be done and
will put unemployed and underemployed citizens back on their feet.
We have an achievable opportunity before
us. Rather than the improbability of an
old regionalism based on the folly of redistribution, we can do a lot with a
new regionalism based on the realism of smart development.
References
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.
1974. Substate Regionalism and the
Federal System Volume IV: Governmental functions and processes – local and
areawide. Washington, DC, February.
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.
1974. Substate Regionalism and the
Federal System Volume III: The challenge of local governmental reorganization.
Washington, DC, February.
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.
1973. Substate Regionalism and the
Federal System Volume II – Case Studies: Regional governance, promise and
performance. Washington, DC, May.
Committee for Economic Development. 1966. Modernizing Local Government. A
statement by the Research and Policy Committee, July
Hill,
Richard C. 1974. “Separate and Unequal:
Governmental Inequality in the Metropolis” American
Political Science Review. 68 (4):1557-1568
Prud'homme, Remy. 1995. “The Dangers of Decentralization” World Bank Research Observer 10 (2):
201-20
Regional Plan Association, RPA Bulletin 129. 1980. Regional Accounts: Structure and performance
of the New York region’s economy in the seventies. RPA Bulletin 129.
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press
