DO
CHINESE CITIES BREAKTHE GLOBAL MOLD? [*]
Hank V. Savitch
Jill Simone Gross
Lin Ye[†]
The
Significance of China’s Urban and Global Experience
The word “global” roles off the
tongue easily. Journalists, politicians,
professors, students and the general public seem to be persuaded that going
global is an inexorable fact of life and bound to be pursued with greater
intensity. Currently there are nearly
374,000 books whose titles contain the word “global”, not to mention countless
articles and “Google hits” (Worldcat, 2010).
Those who express confidence in the “global future” assign it different
meanings and envision different futures.
For some globalism conveys a
state of material being, for others it is a continual process (globalization) and
still other scholars see it as an encompassing environment–– a “global village”
made possible by digital technology (Knight and Gappert, 1989; Hirst and
Thompson, 1996; Short, 2004). In this
special issue, we delve into the entry of Chinese cities onto the global
stage.
China’s new-found globalism is especially
significant because nation-states often achieve world status through the
economic capacity of their city-regions.
Cities now find themselves as spearheads of global processes—whether by
promoting financial services, by serving as shipping ports or by producing
material goods. It is not by coincidence that China’s rise as
a world power is concomitant with rise and growth of its cities. According to the most recent census, China is
officially an urbanized nation, with more than 51% of the population, some 690
million people officially living in cities (Phillips, 2012; National Bureau of
Statistics of China. 2011; Berg, 2012)..
Two major occurrences guide our
inquiry 1) China’s startling rise as a global power and 2) its abrupt and
massive urbanization. Well beyond the “newsworthiness”
of this enormous shift is its analytic and applied value. First, China and its
cities tell us a great deal about the transitional nature of the world hierarchy
of cities. Specifically, we address whether the global entry of China’s cities is
simply the continuation of earlier trends or is it a unique event that is bound
to change existing relationships? To paraphrase
the title of this article; has China broken the global, urban mold?
Second, the changing and
increasingly competitive nature of Chinese intergovernmental relations reveal a
great deal about how city-regions adapt to a globalized world. More
precisely, we find out what has become of local development, regional
sustainability and the quality urban life?
Has China turned to a decentralized intergovernmental system or broken
the mold by adopting it own unique system?
Third, the Chinese experience
enables us to gain a great deal of knowledge about the transfer of ideas in
planning and design. More to the point,
we probe into whether China is bound to suffer the same ruptures that once characterized
urbanization in the West. We address the
hypothetical “what if” propositions by applying Western concepts of urban
planning/design to China’s most pressing challenges of over-population,
efficient production, and a better urban environment. Here again, we touch upon
the question of whether Chinese cities have acquired their own mold of planning
and development?
Last, focusing on the question of
“breaking the urban mold” tells us something about the universality of
contemporary change. The extent to
which Chinese cities follow or diverge from those in the West taps into the
notion of whether deep “structures” (global and economic pressures) determine
the course of urban development or whether agency (culture, political choice)
shape the course of cities. China is an
extraordinarily worthy case because it is at once a great presence in the world
and possibly a very different kind of presence.
Put another way, if China has diverged from existing patterns it may
serve as a model for other non Western societies. Our contribution to scholarship in the urban
field is guided by these concerns and can be found in the pages that follow.
When cities go global they join an interactive
universe of other “world cities”, all of which are conceived as belonging to an
exclusive club of “advanced nations”. Within
particular nations a single or handful of cities predominate with respect to
economic prowess, political stature and cultural prominence. Invariably, cities
serve at the leading edge of global interaction. From a global perspective these cities form a
network of “nodes” through which finance, politics and communication are
transmitted across continents. Human
beings like to classify things and a hierarchy of international importance has come
to define the literature (Taylor, 2004; 2010; Beaverstock, Smith and Taylor,
2005).
Table 1 displays the global
hierarchy of cities as it has been formulated by the Globalization and World
Cities Research Network (GaWC). The
table places cities in various categories based on the relationship that business
firms in a given city have with other firms around the world. The most abundant relationships bring about
the highest number of “connectivities” for a city, thereby assigning it a place
in the urban hierarchy. The sectors
used for the analysis are concentrated in “producer services” (tertiary sectors
that include finance, law, accountancy, advertising and management).
Table 1
The Global
Hierarchy of Cities: 2010
No.
|
Alpha++
|
Alpha+
|
Alpha
|
Alpha-
|
Beta+
|
Beta
|
Beta-
|
1.
|
London
|
Hong Kong
|
Milan
|
Miami
|
Dusseldorf
|
Budapest
|
Abu Dhabi
|
2.
|
New York
|
Paris
|
Beijing
|
Dublin
|
Stockholm
|
Beirut
|
Nicosia
|
3.
|
Singapore
|
Toronto
|
Melbourne
|
Prague
|
Luxembourg
|
Birmingham (UK)
|
|
4.
|
Tokyo
|
Sao Paulo
|
Zurich
|
Montreal
|
Guangzhou
|
Rio De Janeiro
|
|
5.
|
Shanghai
|
Madrid
|
New Delhi
|
Rome
|
Seattle
|
Brisbane
|
|
6.
|
Chicago
|
Mumbai
|
Munich
|
Hamburg
|
Caracas
|
Geneva
|
|
7.
|
Dubai
|
Los Angeles
|
Istanbul
|
Manila
|
Ho Chi Minh City
|
Calcutta
|
|
8.
|
Sydney
|
Moscow
|
Boston
|
Houston
|
Auckland
|
Detroit
|
|
9.
|
Frankfurt
|
Warsaw
|
Berlin
|
Oslo
|
Denver
|
||
10.
|
Mexico City
|
Dallas
|
Athens
|
Kiev
|
Monterrey
|
||
11.
|
Amsterdam
|
Vienna
|
Tel Aviv
|
Chennai
|
Bratislava
|
||
12.
|
Buenos Aires
|
Atlanta
|
Bangalore
|
Bucharest
|
Port Louis
|
||
13.
|
Kuala Lumpur
|
Barcelona
|
Copenhagen
|
Manchester
|
Casablanca
|
||
14.
|
Seoul
|
Bangkok
|
Cairo
|
Karachi
|
Manama
|
||
15.
|
Brussels
|
Taipei
|
Bogota
|
Lima
|
Stuttgart
|
||
16.
|
Jakarta
|
Santiago
|
Vancouver
|
Cape Town
|
Sofia
|
||
17.
|
San Francisco
|
Lisbon
|
Riyadh
|
Cologne
|
|||
18.
|
Washington
|
Philadelphia
|
Montevideo
|
St. Louis
|
|||
19.
|
Johannesburg
|
Minneapolis
|
Helsinki
|
||||
20.
|
Panama City
|
||||||
21.
|
San Diego
|
||||||
22.
|
Lagos
|
||||||
23.
|
Perth
|
||||||
24.
|
Shenzhen
|
||||||
25.
|
Cleveland
|
||||||
26.
|
San Juan
|
||||||
27.
|
Calgary
|
||||||
28.
|
Guatemala City
|
||||||
29.
|
Osaka
|
Source: Globalization and World Cities (GaWC) at http://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/world2010t.html
As the table shows global cities stretch
across the Earth’s surface as a pecking order of designations and names. For purposes of this article the designations
stop at Beta-, but the GaWC rankings do extend into the Gamma category and
beyond. Occupying the highest rungs are
just two megacities in the category of Alpha ++ (New York, London); moving a
notch down we have the category of Alpha + cities (Chicago, Paris); further
down we find Alpha cities (Boston, Zurich); still further down is a larger
category of Beta cities (Seattle, Manchester); and toward the bottom is a
larger designation of cities in the category of Beta – (San Diego, Stuttgart).
We should be careful not to reify this
hierarchy or exaggerate its effects. After
all, a “global hierarchy” is a heuristic construct, whose application is
limited. In a more complicated world of
trade, international conflict and realpolitik, academic breakdowns can go just
so far. Even the abstraction is imperfect
because it is based on a narrow economic dimension, derived from a limited
number of business firms and a relatively small industrial sector. Absent from these classifications are the underlying
cultural, political, scientific and quality of life factors that lie beneath –
the push and pull forces shaping global urban competitiveness.
A city’s place on the global hierarchy
is a function of national power and the geopolitical decisions of actors across
governmental scales. There is a political intentionality that one cannot help
but note that enabled Chinese cities to rise in this hierarchy, and that
concerns the might of the national state China is now the second largest
economy in the world and within that
context that its cities have risen to world prominence. Five Chinese cities can now be found in the
global hierarchy. Hong Kong, Shanghai
are at in the Alpha + category with Beijing close behind. Guangzhou and
Shenzhen are classified as Beta cities. This rise is remarkable, as it has occurred
within little more than a decade.
There should be little wonder,
therefore, that we should be interested in the ramifications of Chinese cities on
the world. We are witnessing a novel experience of a giant, transitional nation
entering a complicated world order that should be closely watched. By this observation alone we expect that Chinese
cities would have an impact on the international urban hierarchy. But that
impact is as yet untested and we do not know whether the hierarchy of global
cities will flatten out or become multi-centered. Our volume also looks within
China to discover impacts both collectively and individually on cities, with particular attention paid to how different
levels of government interact to shape China’s urban landscape in the face of
globalization. We are interested in whether and how different
city-regions collaborate and how that affects local governance. This
allows us to explore the twists and turns of political centralization versus
decentralization.
In sum, China is a lesson in how once
undeveloped cities now respond to global challenges along multiple dimensions. Some of these dimensions are taken up in
Timberlake’s, Wei’s, Ma’s and Hao’s piece in which they investigate some of the
negative social externalities (or the ’dark
side’ of city building) that have accompanied China’s efforts to build global
cities.
China’s Urban Exceptionalism
Exceptionalism conveys the idea
that a country breaks existing patterns, that it is different from its
counterparts and that it holds unique qualities. While there is agreement among
our authors on this basic point, each article reveals significant nuance in
causality, process, and design. Moreover, all agree, that a mix of political
and cultural traditions are being melded together with ideas from the West in
China’s global city development.
Glancing back to Table 1 we see that all of
the top 25 cities on the global hierarchy are located in advanced, post
industrial nations, Hong Kong’s position as number 3 on the global hierarchy
makes China the only transitional nation to have a city at the very top. But Hong Kong has an altogether different
background than its sister cities on the mainland. China’s real exceptions stand out as Shanghai
(Alpha+) and Beijing (Alpha).
There are other compelling reasons
that shape China’s exceptionalism:
·
Size: While the typical advanced nation
has one or two very large cities, China contains fifteen cities whose
population exceeds two million and thirteen megacities in excess of 5 million
inhabitants.
·
Growth: While most cities at the top of
the urban hierarchy are well established and the product of mature economies, the
growth of Chinese cities has been very swift—even remarkable.
·
Development: While almost all of the top
25 cities on the global hierarchy can be described as service sector,
consumption cities, Chinese cities are heavily oriented toward manufacture and developmental
policies.
·
State Directed Capitalism: While almost
all of the top 25 cities on the global hierarchy can loosely be described as
hosting capitalist economies, China remains a mixed system of “state directed
capitalism” which is extremely dynamic.
·
One Party Government: While the
political systems of most global cities are liberal/pluralist, Chinese cities
are governed within the framework of a one (Communist) party system.
·
Local Variation: Within a one party framework
local government in China is quite varied and adaptable to the circumstances at
hand. Relations between all governments
run along vertical and horizontal lines and are subject to cross pressures.
We now take up each of
the above propositions as they relate to Chinese cities in a global context. In doing so we more sharply define their
meaning, probe their implications and analyze their effects.
Size, Scope and Growth
The sheer size
and scope of Chinese cities make them altogether different from global cities
elsewhere. As LeGates’ article in this
collection reveals, the scale, tempo and urban forms found in China today are indeed diverse. Shanghai and Beijing—are more than double the
size of London and New York, which sit atop of the global hierarchy. The geographic boundaries of Chinese cities
do not conform to the municipal boundaries of those in the West (Chan, 2007). They
often cross into rural areas that resemble metropolitan regions or “city
districts” rather than core cities. In fact, as Lin Ye reveals in his
contribution to this volume, China has engineered these regional or
metropolitan relationships, in somewhat unique ways. Chinese cities are immense
and continuous urban settlements of densely packed populations and commerce.
Small, low density or sprawl suburbs are not often seen in China, and the qualitative
aspect of what constitutes a “city” should be considered as part of this
circumstance. If anything, the raw statistics might “understate the size of
Chinese cities” (Chan, 2007: 396).
Table
2 allows us to get a better glimpse of that immensity. Shown in the table are the names, area and
population of 15 Chinese cities. The
table also takes account of a forty year period between 1970 and 2010.
Table
2
Population
and Area in 15 Chinese Cities: 1970-2010
No.
|
City
|
area
|
number of population
|
|||||
sq. km
|
sq. mile
|
1970
|
1980
|
1990
|
2000
|
2010
|
||
1
|
Shanghai
|
6,340.5
|
2,448.1
|
10,816,500
|
11,859,700
|
13,341,900
|
16,407,700
|
23,019,148
|
2
|
Beijing
|
16,801.3
|
6,487.0
|
7,568,495
|
9,230,687
|
10,819,407
|
13,569,194
|
19,612,368
|
3
|
Hong Kong
|
1,104.0
|
426.0
|
3,995,400
|
5,145,100
|
5,524,600
|
6,270,000
|
7,103,000
|
4
|
Tianjin
|
11,760.0
|
4,540.0
|
N/A
|
7,764,141
|
8,785,402
|
9,848,731
|
12,938,224
|
5
|
Wuhan
|
8,494.4
|
3,279.7
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
9,785,392
|
6
|
Guangzhou
|
7,434.0
|
2,870.0
|
3,031,486
|
5,630,733
|
6,299,943
|
9,942,022
|
12,700,800
|
7
|
Shenzen
|
2,050.0
|
790.0
|
N/A
|
351,871
|
1,214,800
|
7,008,428
|
10,357,938
|
8
|
Shenyang
|
12,942.0
|
4,997.0
|
3,493,000
|
3,913,000
|
4,655,000
|
4,828,000
|
8,106,171
|
9
|
Chongqing
|
82,401.0
|
31,815.0
|
N/A
|
6,301,000
|
15,297,000
|
30,512,763
|
28,846,170
|
10
|
Nanjing
|
6,598.0
|
2,548.0
|
3,605,300
|
4,358,700
|
5,018,200
|
5,448,900
|
8,004,680
|
11
|
Harbin
|
53,100.0
|
20,500.0
|
2,122,000
|
2,467,000
|
2,991,000
|
2,928,000
|
3,132,000
|
12
|
Xi'an
|
9,983.0
|
3,854.0
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
7,410,000
|
8,467,837
|
13
|
Chengdu
|
2,129.0
|
822.0
|
6,922,918
|
8,225,399
|
9,195,004
|
10,392,531
|
14,047,625
|
14
|
Changchun
|
20,532.0
|
7,927.0
|
1,430,000
|
1,698,000
|
2,192,000
|
3,093,000
|
7,459,005
|
15
|
Hangzhou
|
16,847.0
|
6,505.0
|
1,034,000
|
1,164,000
|
1,476,000
|
1,780,000
|
2,151,000
|
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China; Hong
Kong Census & Statistics Department; local government websites; Economist
Intelligence Unit report; Chan, Kam Wing, 2007. Misconceptions and Complexities
in the Study of China's Cities: Definitions, statistics, and implications. Eurasian Geography and Economics 48 (4): 383-412.
The area and population of all
these cities is huge by Western standards. Shanghai and Beijing
stand respectively at nearly 6,474 square kilometers (2,500 square miles) and 16,801
square kilometers (6,500 square miles). As can be seen in the table,
their populations range between 19 and 23 million. By comparison Greater
London and consolidated New York City respectively hold 1,572
square kilometers (607 square miles) and 782 square kilometers (302 square
miles). The populations for each of these Western cities are 8
million—less than half as much as that of Shanghai and Beijing. The much larger
and sprawling regions of New York and London do figure into the thousands of
square kilometers (square miles) and hold double digit populations, but their
bucolic extensions are in no way comparable to being considered as
“cities”. By Western standards London and New York are giants. More
typical are “smaller” cities like Paris, Milan and Zurich whose areas are in
the range of 30 to 100 square miles and contain little more than 2 million
residents. Even when we include the larger regions of these cities they
are dwarfed by their Chinese counterparts.
The one Chinese city that does resemble
the largest Western cities is Hong Kong which counts just 1,000 square
kilometers (426 square miles) and 7 million residents. However, Hong Kong is unusual for China
because its island geography provides natural borders and it is very much a
product of the British occupation. Even
today it is a “Special Administrative Region” within China and operates under a
different political and economic system.
Here then is an instance where the exception proves the rule of Chinese
“exceptionalism”.
The most unique aspect of Chinese
cities is their remarkable rates of growth.
By and large we have seen a doubling and tripling in size. To take some examples over the last 40 years,
Shanghai went from 10 to 23 million; Beijing from 7 to 19 million; Nanjing from
3 to 8 million; Chengdu from 7 to 14 million and Hangzhou from one to 2
million. Even well-established Hong Kong
nearly doubled its size. Guangzhou and Shenzhen more than tripled their population.
Like other great cities around the world Chinese cities are the product
of immigration—in this case from rural to urban areas. A process facilitated in
part by what Wang refers to in his article in this volume, as a shift in the
mode of regulation from centralized command
to decentralization and marketization". While the new system offers opportunity for
those seeking employment it also produces constraints on urban development and
inter-regional tension. China’s urban growth is also multi directional. Its cities are growing from the push of
outward flows as well as from the inside outward. Suburbs meld with the core
city as the core itself undergoes radical change in structure and content. In
some instances urban and rural uses mix indiscriminately (a sign of
transition). Nearly 14 percent of Wuhan’s economy consists of agricultural use
(Wuhan Statistical Information, 2011)
Looking at this from a comparative
perspective, we know that great western cities also experienced rapid growth
during their industrial age. In most cases the growth time frame exceeded a
half century and was not as significant. London took over 60 years to reach its
current population. New York City and Paris both took about 40 years. By contrast
the rate and extent of growth of Chinese cities has been nothing short of
cataclysmic. Whether this represents a
quantitative shift or a qualitative change in how transitional cities might
grow in the future is the subject at hand.
Development
through State Directed Capitalism
China’s impressive gains in gross
domestic product and per capita income are very much a product of cities that
have come to the fore. Since 2011 urbanization in China surpassed 50
percent. Urbanization also means the rise
of a middle class and a restructured economy.
We know that nations develop and gain wealth and influence by
urbanizing.
Table
3 shows the rapidity of this change for China’s top 15 cities. Shown in the table are changes in gross
domestic product (GDP) between 1970 and 2010.
Table 3
Gross Product in Seven Chinese Cities
No.
|
City
|
GDP (US$ Billion) based on PPP
|
% change
|
Note on % change
|
||||
1978
|
1980
|
1990
|
2000
|
2010
|
||||
1
|
Shanghai
|
16.200
|
20.820
|
16.342
|
57.634
|
253.578
|
1465
|
1978-2010
|
2
|
Beijing
|
6.461
|
9.286
|
10.47
|
38.192
|
208.488
|
3127
|
1978-2010
|
3
|
Hong Kong
|
3.8
|
28.8
|
76.9
|
169.1
|
224.5
|
5808
|
1978-2010
|
4
|
Tianjin
|
4.908
|
6.911
|
6.501
|
20.558
|
136.265
|
2676
|
1978-2010
|
5
|
Wuhan
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
25.489
|
72.605
|
185
|
2000-2010
|
6
|
Guangzhou
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
22.703
|
N/A
|
95.484
|
321
|
1996-2009
|
7
|
Shenzen
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
14.935
|
N/A
|
91.355
|
512
|
1996-2009
|
Source: Shanghai Basic
Information, Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics, Hong Kong Census &
Statistics Department, Tianjin Statistical Information Net, Statistical
Information of Wuhan, National Bureau of Statistics of China, Ailing & Xie.
The proportional changes are
impressive. Shanghai registered over 1,000 percent increase; Beijing saw an
increase of 3000 percent and an already advanced Hong Kong grew by 5000
percent. China’s up and coming cities in
its south like Guangzhou and Wu Han enjoyed rises of several hundred
points. All told this has meant that a
new middle class had come to inhabit cities in all parts of the country. Large scale apartment complexes line city
boulevards; automobiles clog and pollute the environment.
These figures are modest by Western
standards whose GDPs in absolute numbers are considerably higher. New York’s
and Tokyo’s GDP of over a trillion dollars is three times higher than its top
Chinese rivals. Paris’ and London’s GDP of
more than $350 billion substantially exceeds its top Chinese rivals. Nevertheless, the rapidity of the gains and
trend lines for Chinese cities are very impressive.
Furthermore, most cities in
advanced nations are largely focused on employment in service sectors and mass consumption. Western cities have lost most of their
manufacturing capability and now rely on producer and professional services to
generate multiplier effects. The
synergies between a service economy and upscale consumption are keys to this
dynamic. New York and London have come to be seen as “entertainment machines”
(Clark, 2004). Theaters, sports stadia, cultural centers, hotels and
restaurants define their appeal. This
goes hand in hand with a search to promote their economies by catering to a “creative
class” that is capable of producing new patents and feeding cultural enterprise
(Florida, 2004).
Chinese cities have yet to achieve
that status. Their growth is not based
on being “entertainment machines”, but on having become the world’s
factories. A few comparisons between
East and West illustrate the issue. Taking
trends during the last decade, manufacture in London, New York and Paris
accounted for about 7 percent of their employment (Kantor et al, 2012). The only Chinese city that followed the
Western pattern was Hong Kong with less than 4 percent in manufacture. In every other major city the proportion of
the economy devoted to manufacture was quite high. In Shanghai it reached 36 percent; Beijing’s
total was 24 percent; Tianjin stood at 35 percent; and Wuhan held at 37 percent
(Shanghai Local Government, 2010: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics, 2010;
Tianjin Statistical Information Net, 2006; Wuhan Statistical Information,
2011). This does not even count China’s
biggest factory town, Shenzhen. This phenomenon is largely due to the strong drive
of local governments in China to provide heavily subsidized industrial land to
attract investment and capital and to win out in inter-city competitions for
growth.
This is not to say that Chinese
cities are purely venues for manufacturing.
While manufacturing still predominates, most Chinese cities are telescoping
both industrial (secondary) sectors and post-industrial (tertiary) sectors
through massive development. Producer services and tertiary sector employment
are taking a greater hold in many cities, particularly in Shanghai and Beijing
(Hong Kong has long been a financial site).
Also, entertainment does have a role in a few cities and mega events are used to
stimulate development and make
cities more visible on the global stage. In 2008 Beijing hosted the Olympics. Shanghai sponsored the World Expo,
Guangzhou held the Asian Games in 2010, and Shenzhen served as the site for the Universiade in 2011.
Behind
much of this massive development is “state directed capitalism”. The term may seem like an oxymoron, but it
has a culture and logic of its own. This concept is at the center of some articles
in this collection. Unlike the former Soviet Union, China did not dismantle its
socialist system, but modified it to allow a degree of market centered
development. State directed capitalism connotes the comingling of public
intervention with market driven enterprise. This system also entails the co-
existence and even the complementarity of public and private enterprise. This
topic is taken up in Zhang’s contribution to this collection, which evaluates
the applicability of growth models to the Chinese case. In Sonia Schoon’s
article, we see the ways in which China has used its power to concede some informality to its cities,
in efforts to encourage experimentation and innovation. Schoon is quick to remind us that more static
and centrally defined frameworks emerge over time. In referring to the same tendency, Ye and
Wang make it clear that despite market reforms, China’s national government
continues to exert strong controls.
The processes of state directed
capitalism have unfolded steadily since the late 1970s. It has injected nearly 50
percent of China’s gross domestic product into creating new infrastructure and
economic investments (IMF, 2012: 24). Highways,
shipping ports, rail systems, airports and power stations have fed the
country’s rapid urbanization. The mechanisms can be quite intricate and occur
at many levels of society. First and
foremost, infrastructure investments have been made in conjunction with foreign
businesses and new domestic enterprises.
This enabled the government to build on strategic sites reinvigorating
once dormant towns and clustering them with larger still growing ones. This strategy has created critical synergies
for easier transportation, efficient production and innovation. Examples of
linked cities can be seen in Shanghai-Suzhou, Beijing-Tianjin and the Guangzhou-Shenzhen
megalopolises.
Second, both state and local
governments collaborate in establishing incentives for business enterprises
(especially manufacturing). China relies
on a leasehold system of land rights enabling it to control uses. Localities are able to extend special leasing
arrangements to investors and have freely done so. The leasing of land to business is abetted by
a tax system that derives more revenue from manufacturing establishments than
other businesses. What has come to be
called “construction oriented public finance” has also been used to fund land clearance
and build utility lines (electric, water) that can be cheaply accessed by
industry (Wang, 2011).
Third, in a shift of earlier
policies of support for public housing, central and local governments have sold
off large stocks for private use. Residential
housing is being commodified as private leaseholds, and manufacturing is being
given precedence over other uses. Safeguards to preserve historic neighborhoods
that have come to characterize Western cities (often too late) are far less common
in China. Local officials have not been
squeamish about displacing residents, so that factories could be located at
valued land sites. Historic
neighborhoods have been wiped away and residents obliged to relocate to
impersonal apartment blocks. Thus, the land cost for industrial uses remains
strikingly stable in the last few decades compared to the skyrocketing residential
housing prices in Chinese cities.
Last, a miscellany of supports and
systemic arrangements bolster competition within and between Chinese cities. These
include direct loans and grants to business as well as special land use
rights. The dual system of socialism and
private enterprise facilitates the entry of new business. It is not uncommon for municipal department
to set up their own enterprise and contest existing markets. All told, Chinese cities enjoy an amalgam of
differently owned businesses. State owned enterprises account for 28 percent of
businesses; privately owned units hold another 26 percent; self-employed
individuals constitute 19 percent of businesses and the rest is distributed between
various collectives and units funded from outside the mainland (China
Statistical Yearbook, 2011; Zhang, 2012).
For Westerners the system may seem unusual but it has worked in the
short run to catapult Chinese cities into the 21st century.
One
Party Governance with Many Variations
Whatever might be said of Chinese
governance it is complex and multifaceted. Every article in this volume
addresses this topic, either through the lens of place making (Timberlake),
planning (LeGates), local state re-engineering (Wang) land centered development
coalitions (Zhang), metropolitan development (Ye), village urbanization (Smith), or
conceded informality (Schoon).
Certainly, China is a “strong state” where central decision makers hold ultimate
authority and can wield the sword of intervention. Nevertheless, once the basic framework is
understood we see leeway, flexibility and a quest for adaptability. The familiar phrase for Hong Kong/ Mainland relations
of “One Country/ Two Systems” can be amended to read “One Party/Many
Variations”.
Underlying
China’s internal politics are significant geographical variations. China is a vast country consisting of very
different villages, towns, cities, provinces and a large rural landscape. LeGates article provides detail of the
variety of urban forms in China today, as well as those being newly created. Combine
this with the exigencies of a vast and rapid urbanization and we can appreciate
the need for flexibility of operations and a tolerance for local
discretion. Also important is China’s
cultural tradition of pragmatism. Schoon
(2011:14) likens this pragmatism to “groping for stones” where getting to the
other side of a stream requires “testing and probing” of prevailing
opportunities. Likewise, a willingness
to experiment allows cities to move in varied directions and explains why local
politics may differ so dramatically from one place to another.
Central/local
relations are best characterized as consisting of cross pressures that flow
vertically and horizontally. Central authorities set the pace on critical
matters concerning revenues, planning and economic decisions. At the same time localities often work around
those constraints and even push back.
Thus, localities hold considerable budget discretion on how local revenue is counted and
applied; how much land is apportioned for residence, recreation and industry; how
resources are applied; and, what decisions to make regarding the content of
local enterprise. The question often
asked about Chinese cities is whether the system is governed by top-down
decisions or bottom-up decisions? The
answer very much depends upon a locality’s ability to maneuver within the
system and the particular issue at hand.
In addition, we should not discount the
influence Hong Kong and Macau, as Special Administrative Regions (SARs), have
had on the rest of the nation. The SAR status affords them distinct trading prerogatives,
considerable civil liberties and entrepreneurial freedom. By acknowledging that different systems can co-exist
in one country, China has opened a pathway to political pluralism. Different cities already have more or less liberal
administrations, more or less private enterprise and more or less privileges
for residents. Whether these
differences result in gradual moves toward local democracy is an open
question. The fact is we can identify a
healthy measure of political slack in the governing system.
Most
interesting about Chinese cities are their burgeoning horizontal networks of
cooperation, a theme addressed by Ye herein. Again, much of the stimulus comes
from Hong Kong and the possibilities emanating from that affluent island. Inter local collaboration has occurred under
the initiative of central officials and with the blessing of those at the local
level. Since its incorporation into
China in 1997, Hong Kong began to link up with Guangzhou and other localities
in the Pearl River Delta (PRD). A
keystone of this regional cooperation is the Closer Economic Partnerships
Agreement (CEPA) signed in 2003. Inter
local cooperation is also buttressed by formally adopted plans surrounding the
development of the Delta region.
While
the basis for these agreements and plans are economic, they have solidified
around common decisions. As of yet, we cannot point to a comprehensive regional
government, though the PRD is now laced with decision-making networks. Central
and local officials regularly convene to finance and work through development
initiatives, a topic that Wang explores.
Besides physical development, the PRD has begun to cohere around other
issues like curbing environmental pollution, improving transportation and
establishing public health facilities. The
intensity of activity has led to other avenues of cooperation. Guangzhou and Hong Kong have now agreed to common
professional standards for evaluating the competency of accountants, architects
and structural engineers (Chung, 2011).
All
this may seem like very minor steps toward regional governance. But the linkages should be judged in light
of the PRD’s greater dynamism, the economic
prowess of Hong Kong and the strategic prominence of Guangzhou. Collaboration in the Pearl River Delta has
generated a good deal of attention and could serve as a model for other
regions. Progress by increments can have enduring effects, as the accumulation
of small accomplishments become major breakthroughs. Habits, practices and
common values can lead to institution building and institutions make collective
action possible. It should be noted that the entire PRD region
resides within the Guangdong province. The strong top-down provincial
leadership makes the inter-city collaboration and cooperation with Hong Kong
and Macau politically more possible and easier.
Finally, the experience of the
Pearl River Delta contains lessons for both China as a transitional nation and its
role on the global stage. It not only
underscores how Chinese localities act in concert through regional cooperation,
but it highlights why globalization is such a stimulating force.
Unraveling the Questions and
Searching the Answers
In
one fashion or another, the articles in this volume argue that Chinese cities operate in a global
context which spin off both positive and negative externalities; the development
of Chinese cities are transitional reflections of these tradeoffs; and, patterns
of central-local relations are adaptations to pressures for development and
demands for greater pluralism.
Timberlake et al. open the
discussion with a broad presentation of the global urban hierarchy. They e describe this hierarchy as one of
“increasing volume, velocity and scope” (2012: 2). Global cities are seen as having formed networks of interaction
that connect people and capital through flows of information. Timberlake et al. focus on how global theory
compares to actual practices in China.
Three cities occupy their attention—Guangzhou, Beijing and
Shanghai. Each of these has been
impacted by globalization and responded to it in various ways.
This piece is followed by Richard LeGates
novel analysis of how Western models of urban design might be applied to China.
Using the works of Ebenezer Howard, Albert Soria y Mata, Frank Lloyd Wright, Le
Corbusier and Clarence Perry, LeGates
illustrates how earlier ideas can be applied to 21st century China. As the title of this article suggests, the
concepts of “vision”, “tempo” “scale” and “form” are employed to portray
problems of rapid urbanization. In doing so, LeGates uncovers how a rapidly
changing and dense landscape can be made humane and feasible.
The next article on “development” engages the content of China’s urban
dynamism. Lei Wang examines how “state
directed capitalism” actually works. Wang accomplishes this though the lens of
central-local relations. He demonstrates
how both central and local officials employ incentives and land use controls to
maximize development. The critical
component of local discretion is not lost on Wang. He shows that relations are structured so as
to make it in local government’s own interest to pursue development. Here then
are the levers that allow Chinese cities to grow so rapidly.
Sumei Zhang puts the focus on the emerging cities of Suzhou and Shenzhen. She shows how land use policy works in China,
and explores the utility of the western concept of growth coalitions to understand these dynamics. Zhang’s contribution is to lay bare the dual
system of socialism and capitalism as they pertain to land rights. This is a critical and telling piece of
scholarship, not often told about China.
Zhang also takes the unorthodox path of showing just how two cities in
the same nation can differ so much from one another.
The last section of this volume
deals broadly with “governance” as it pertains to urban development. Sonia Schoon opens the topic by pointing up
cultural and historical features that undergird decision making. She also brings to light the diversity of
Chinese cities and attributes that to a culture of experimentation. While the author is realistic about the
openness of Chinese society, she is also nuanced in her ability to sort through
the variations and bring them to light.
Subsequent articles focus more closely on governance. In the following article Lin Ye argues for a new analysis of Chinese metropolitan governance. Using the Pearl River Delta as a case study,
the author shows us how clustering cities for creative synergies can make all
the difference. Professor Ye brings to us the idea that regional governance can
flourish under a dirigiste state. Such a model is useful to study regional
governance in Asian countries.
Smith takes on the binary,
inter-scalar village urbanization issue in China. As Smith argues in his article, village
urbanization arises from the specific strategies and tactics of scalar actors
competing for control over development. Urbanization has been employed as a way
to exploit economic growth and showcase local officials’ achievement. The speed
and scope of development demand rapid-fire execution of village plans. Such
speedily (un)planned urbanization risks destroying villager and migrant lives
and livelihoods and pulls resources from the countryside to cities.
While largely enthusiastic about
the changes afoot in Chinese cities, many of the authors in this collection are
also cautionary. Urbanization and economic growth are occurring with some
unevenness. Economic restructuring processes in Chinese cities differ from those
experienced in the west. While the state
has been active at redefining its role in development, it has been less active
in terms of managing the social problems that accompany Chinese urbanization. The
path Chinese policy makers negotiate, like a tight rope is tricky.
There is no question in the minds
of all the authors here that Chinese cities are destined to continue to grow in
scale and international reach. In the process they are reweaving the fabric of
the ‘global landscape’. All told the articles in this collection go a long way
in helping us understand the contemporary state of Chinese cities in a global
context and what is at stake. We trust
our goals have been realized.
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ARTICLES IN THIS
SPECIAL EDITION
Introduction
Hank V.
Savitch, Jill Simone Gross and Lin, Do Chinese Cities Break the Global Mold?
Global Contexts
Timberlake,
Michael, Wei, Yehua Dennis, Hao, Jianmei
and Ma, Xiulian. 2014. Global Cities with Chinese Characteristics.
LeGates,
Richard. Visions, Scale, Tempo, and Form
in China's Emerging City-regions.
Urban Development
Zhang,
Sumei. Land-Centered Urban Politics in
Transitional China--Can It Be Explained by the Growth Machine Theory?
Wang,
Lei. Forging Growth by Governing the
Market in Reform-era Urban China.
Formal and Informal
Governance
Schoon,
Sonia. Chinese Strategies of Experimental Governance. The Underlying Forces
Influencing Urban Restructuring in the Pearl River Delta.
Ye,
Lin. 2014. State-Led Metropolitan Governance in China: Making Integrated City
Regions.
Smith,
Nick. 2014. Beyond Top-Down/Bottom-Up: Village Transformation on China's Urban
Edge.
[*]
Acknowledgement: Many of the
articles included in this special edition were presented as first draft papers at
the International Conference on Regional and Urban Development in the 21st
Century and Lingnan Forum in December 16-18, 2011 in Guangzhou, China, hosted
by the Center for Chinese Public Administration Research, Sun Yat-sen
University and Guangdong Social Science Association.
[†]
Please direct correspondence to Lin Ye,
Center for Chinese Public Administration Research, School of Government, Sun
Yat-sen University in Guangzhou, China.
Email: ylljc@hotmail.com.
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