TERRITORY,
AGENCY AND GLOBALIZATION
There
is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more
dangerous to handle than to initiate a new order of things.
Nicolo Machiavelli, The Prince (1640)
Global
Backdrop
It is by now a cliché to suggest
that globalization has changed the world.
Exactly how those changes are manifest is still an open question. Still more important is the connection
between global pressures and urban territories.
As we see it, globalization encompasses two phases—one of initiating flows of change and another
of incurring its consequences. A
metaphor of this process could liken the initiating
phase of globalization to a rapidly moving river while the consequences would be more akin to the river leaving sediments of
deposit on adjoining land.[i]
We
might say that globalization initiates
rapid, intense, interaction across the world. Initiation is dynamic and occurs at all levels
-- technological, economic, political and social. At the same time these flows have profound consequences for the spatial contours of
cities. These consequences have permeated
existing boundaries, shortened time spans and introduced what has come to be
known as the “global village”.
Globalization
is driven by a digital age which has sped
up communication and radically augmented the distribution of information. By the sheer touch of buttons over $6 trillion
in capital is moved around the world each day (Goaswami, et al 2007;
International Monetary Fund, 2010). Digital technology also moves news around
the planet in unprecedented time and quantity. Media, like BBC or CNN, have
established global news networks, allowing the world to witness the same events
at the same time. Impressions are created instantly and reactions occur
swiftly.
On
the economic-political front globalization is propelled by heavier flows of trade
as well as cross national political agreements. The flow between different economies is made
possible by political agreements that facilitate currency exchanges, ease of
travel, security guarantees and cooperation between governments. The European Union (EU), the North American
Free Trade Act (NAFTA) the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) and the Association of South East Asian Nations are just some examples
of the international bridges built in recent times.[ii][iii]
Taken collectively the increased flows of change have
other ramifications. Once goods and common policies are absorbed on a worldwide
basis they create a common transnational framework. International consumption
is conducted through single currencies, uniform business procedures and
standardized rules for patents, copyrights and passports. Google and Nike not only elicit mass
recognition, but do so with little reference to national demarcations. Even
sports have drawn upon simultaneous global displays of the Olympic Games,
“world cups” and tennis or golf “opens”.
Finally, globalization is spurred by social flows consisting of large
scale immigration and cross cultural exchanges. Over little more than three decades the number
of immigrants has doubled and now includes 175 million people (3 percent of the
world’s population). Almost all of these
have re-settled in advanced societies in Europe, North America and parts of
Asia (UNDESA,
2002).
The
consequences of globalization for
cities are equally compelling. The digital age has made cities
both unnecessary and essential. On the one hand, cities have been rendered
unnecessary because their strategic spaces were no longer suitable for
manufacture. Technology also invoked
the “death of distance”, so that concentrating industry in a single center
yielded few if any advantages. Why
bundle up within a single center when business can be conducted from office
parks in nearby suburbs or from computer terminals in mountainside retreats
(Webber, 1963; Klotkin; 2000; Weber and Kwan, 2002).
On the other hand, the essentiality
of cities stemmed from the fact that the radical decentralization of industry
evoked a complementary need to centralize their management, finance and
coordination (Cairncross, 2001; Sassen, 2001).
Central business districts were born anew with smart buildings, hotels and
convention halls. Cities may have lost assets when factories departed and all
one could see were boarded up buildings, but they made up for it by their
ability to connect things. Post industrial
cities were said to be “transaction maximizing systems” in an expanding
universe of far flung factories, banks, retail outlets and warehouses. London, New York, Hong Kong and Tokyo became leading, round the clock
financial centers for the new “global village”.
Cities have come to be treated as
belonging to different hierarchies and rated in terms of their centrality to
the global economy as Alpha, Beta or Gamma cities (Knox and Taylor, 1995). So keen became the inter city competition to
advance within this hierarchy that local leaders often consult global
indicators to determine where their cities stand. In the wake globalization cities aggressively
seek their “competitive advantage”. The race has inaugurated a new industry of professionals
offering to “rebrand” or “market” a city into fame. For
some the news has been quite good and a few cities rose quickly into the Alpha
or Beta ranks. But competitive advantage
cannot be had equally by all. The very
idea of competitive advantage entails that some cities gain, others fall behind
and still others may tumble out of range.
For every Austin or Singapore that rose to the fore, there also has been
a Youngstown or an Essen which never managed to find a new post industrial life
(OECD, 2006; EU, 2007). Metropolitan areas also face widening
territorial splits reinforced by social class and race. In metropolitan New York the affluent buy
mansions in the posh suburbs of Bronxville, leaving poor blacks and Latinos in the
tenements of the Bronx. In France’s
leading metropolis, the rich settle in central Paris while North African immigrants
and their children are shuttled into the run down public housing of La Courneuve.
Last,
we observe that the other side of global interdependence is local vulnerability. Free trade may have made some cities wealthy,
but they have also made them more fragile and susceptible to crisis. The fiscal
crisis of 2007-08 made that all too apparent; in matter of minutes, turmoil on
Wall Street upset finance in London that was soon telegraphed around the
world. Disease also travels as swiftly
as airline flights and has acquired an international character (Savitch and
Ardashev, 2001). Aids, Sars, Bird Flu and
even international terror threaten everyone with the same ease of movement and
consequent pandemic.
In sum globalization
is an encompassing phenomenon. It is initiated by a multiplicity of flows ranging from technological
innovation to free trade, political exchanges and the wholesale transference of
populations. Its consequences are
also multidimensional and punctuated by spreading urbanization, sharpening
social rivalries, reactive political leadership and more vulnerable societies. All this has profoundly affected the
territory upon which these changes occur.
The meaning of the word “urban” has been rethought, the distinction
between different types of landscapes has been reconceived and once
impenetrable boundaries are now thought to be open gateways. The central question before us is how far
globalization has really gone in bringing about this new conception of
territory, to what extent are new territorial conceptions valid and most
important what does it all really mean?
To this we now turn.
Globalization and Territorial Rescaling
Scholars draw a ready connection
between the advent of globalization and what has come to be broadly designated
as rescaling. In the interests of
ecumenism, we treat rescaling as an embracing concept involving the reconfiguration
or remaking of boundaries, sometimes carried out in combination with recognized
governing institutions and at other times not. As such rescaling has two likely applications,
both of which are socially produced and geographically ordered. First, it establishes physical or demographic demarcations
of territory or what we refer to as informal
rescaling. We see this as de facto rescaling
brought about by scientific advances (communication, transportation) that change
access to land, relationships between different land masses and the uses to
which land is put. Second, is de jure
rescaling brought about by the imposition of political institutions upon particular
territories or what we call formal
rescaling. Under formal rescaling institutions may not be contiguous with
local economies or demographic realities and the new demarcations can either
fall short of the mark and result in being under-bounded or go past the mark
and cause an area to be over-bounded. In either case rescaling is very real
because it imbues particular areas with certain prerogatives and
responsibilities. Most scholars agree
that rescaling results in something which brings about a different state of
affairs from that which previously existed. That “something” may vary from increased
communication across spaces forming virtual communities, to coordinated
transportation systems that knit together actual communities, all the way to
regional councils that make policy for constituent communities. Whatever the
form it takes, rescaling has profound implications for how territory is
developed and can do many things to land.
In a figurative sense it has meant that territory can be reshaped,
stretched or even shrunk.
When
rescaling is limited to informal changes it can be expressed in a variety of
urban forms. We might see the retention
of small unincorporated villages contrasted to the growth of urban agglomerations
or we might see a metamorphosis of urban agglomerations into continuously
urbanized land masses (London’s Greater South East Region or the BosWash
megalopolis). When rescaling is combined
with an institutional embodiment it can be expressed in different ways. Some types of formal rescaling include the
fusion of separate localities into a single municipality (Toronto)
the imposition of an umbrella authority over multiple jurisdictions (Minneapolis-St.
Paul) the establishment of large regional councils (Lyon) and the creation of compacts
between cities (Hong Kong). Formal rescaling can also include changes in lateral
relations between different levels of authority (Southern California
Association of Governments)
Returning
now to how rescaling fits into the world arena, John Friedman’s (1986, 2001)
groundbreaking work illustrates how global forces induce localities to
reorganize space and shape political relations.[iv] Friedman was later joined by others who sought
to unlock rescaling’s mysteries. Some writers
took a few steps back to examine the underlying structures of a social order—hence
their designation as structuralists. Not
easily seen, these factors consist of protracted, underlying (latent) dynamics that
drive more visible (manifest) decisions.
For many structuralists the key to change hinges on economic system of a
given time--or as they conceive it how wealth is produced, traded, accumulated
or circulated. Boiled down to its
essentials, if economic conditions are based on simple agriculture and trade,
territory is likely to be divided into small independent units (feudalism). Once
digital economies take root, much larger assemblages of land are needed to
facilitate the flow of capital. Structuralists have sought to interpret our global
age as having surpassed manufacture, bringing about radically new ways in which
territory is conceived and treated.
Braudel’s (1984) historical application
of structuralism is pertinent here. By using the grand sweep of history he saw the
advance of capitalism expanding territory from a city centric to a state
centric system. By this stroke Braudel
showed that economics not only gave birth to the modern state, but to a new version
of territorial control. The new historiography
has its complement in Harvey’s
Marxist geography. Harvey’s own version of structuralism deals
with globalization head on by pointing up the dialectic between the circulation
of capital and the “compression” of increasingly large swaths of territory
(1982). The faster the circulation of capital the shorter became the distance
between different points on the planet.
Any gluts in the circulation of
capital are dealt with through a “spatial fix”, where new urban landscapes
(cities, airports,) are constructed to serve as outlets for investors (Harvey, 2001). In language
reminiscent of Einstein’s physics Harvey
brackets together the speed of capital with the transformation of land usage. Much as time could be changed by velocity, so
too can territory be transformed by the passage of instant, globalized
currency.
Other scholars amplified this
commentary. Swyngedouw (1997) crystallized this thinking by underscoring the
nexus between global economic change and local decision making—hence his
coinage of the term “glocalization” to describe this combination. Following on
this, Brenner (1999) amplified the notion of “glocalization” by arguing that
different economic cycles produced different kinds of territorial
formulations. His inquiry is framed as a
probe into how “the current round of capitalist globalization has entailed a
territorial reorganization” (1999: 6). By
Brenner’s account Keynesian capitalism produced fixed spaces that conformed to
the needs of a welfare state, while a post Keynesian (neo liberal) period
produced unregulated and unconnected spaces more conductive to a free global
market. Brenner then goes on to recognize
formal rescaling, underscoring that spatial changes led to an “institutional
scaffolding”, upon which governments could regulate and mobilize capital (Brenner;
2004: 447). Michael Keating deepens the
picture by pointing out that “as the state is penetrated by the market regional
actors [are] forced into a more direct relationship with the external world” (Keating,
1998: 14). Finally, Jessop (2000:35) put
the cap on the structuralist bottle by describing these quick and mechanical
adjustments as “reflexive rationality” where territorial units automatically
recalibrate decisions in order to facilitate capital accumulation.
Most evident in structural accounts is
a conception of a system responding to an external stimulus. Capital circulation produces new geographies
with cities or city regions serving as its containers or as its processors. Governance
is either greatly constrained to do capital’s bidding or relegated to a
residual category. For the most part its
responses are automated and often described in the passive voice. Thus we
read that “the state is penetrated by the markets and territories are
remoulded” (Keating, 1998:14). The explanations appear to halt at this level
with little effort to discuss who does what to whom. Actors are hardly present in this scenario, much
less is there any sign of, hesitation, heated debate or rejection of re-scaling. Quite often, the process of change is automated
and bloodless. Systems scale up toward bigger territorial control or scale down
to smaller units of territory—all done to the dictates of economic necessity.
Another strain of thought, what we describe
as eclectic, comes to similar
conclusions, albeit by different methods and a different ontology. Eclectic writers rely more on systematic data and
are inclined to go beyond economics to embrace a variety of explanations. Among the variables they cite are demographics,
communications, infrastructure and culture.
Here too eclectic writers concentrate on abstract forces; glaringly
absent is the influence of power and the role of institutions.
One of the foremost eclectic writers,
Peter Hall (2009) takes a long view by analyzing how a variety of historical
changes operate in shaping the contours of territory. Hall too finds that territorial change will
trend toward a single direction, guided and surmounted by the force of
technology and the homogenizing effects of culture. Laing and Knox (2009) join the issue by showing
how massive demographic shifts contribute to the prevailing teleology. Along with other researchers they point up
that spreading populations lead to new settlements over a much enlarged
landscape. Change redounds upon change
as expanded settlements warrant new infrastructure and new infrastructure generates
still more development, which in turn changes the very morphology of cities. By the 21st century traditional
cities that were once identified by clear boundaries have become a thing of the
past. Old fashion concepts like “city”,
“suburb” or “metropolis” are now considered to be “zombie categories” (Beck and
Williams, 2003). The new age calls for large polycentric, fluid
forms where traditional distinctions blur and disappear. As writers struggle to define this new “reterritorialization”
the nomenclature swells to include a flood of neologisms like the “100 mile city”, the “urban
realm”, “exopolis”, “splintering urbanism” and the loftiest of all titles the “galactic
metropolis” (Sudjic, 1992; Vance, 1977; Soja, 1996; Graham and Marvin, 2001; Lewis,
1983)
In this post city era everything
revolves around “space of flows” or “polynets” rather than territorial distinctions
(Castells, 1989; Hall, 2009). Having
adopted this conception it is difficult to see territory as anything but a
cipher for people communicating within particular networks. Is all of this merely a set of processes? If
this is the case, and most territories can also be converted into vessels of
communication what then becomes of their relative importance? Is one place interchangeable with another? Despite
the fog, some writers have attempted to make something of new urban forms. Neumann and Hull (2009: 783) find its tangibility in a
“spatial-institutional isomorphism” that weaves together the governing
capacities of disparate networks. Others search to identify how these new
territorial complexities are governed, how they conduct politics or how they
make policy. Stoker (1998: 23) finds
that “networks are self governing”. Like markets, he argues, networks bring self
interested actors together through a type of fluid “governance”. The remaining theoretical gaps are resolved by
introducing the notion of “heterarchy”, meaning that territories can manage on
their own. Heterarchy describes the “self
organizing” abilities of networks. These
explanations are left however as assertion with very little verification
(Jessop 1998: 29).
What substantively occurs within
these urban forms is not specified. We are
still left in the dark about the contents of “space of flows” “polynets” or “networks”. Granted some of those who have written on
the subject are geographers who are more interested in spatial dynamics than
what actually occurs within that space. In
dealing with this issue we might distinguish between abstract spatial
transactions and tangible changes on the ground. But few if any writers of any persuasion draw
this distinction, much less examine the linkage between spatial and territorial
change. Whether or not increased spatial
transactions lead to territorial adjustments is still an open question. More generally, how or why rescaling actually
occurs is still unknown yet it remains vital to explaining the forces behind
territorial change. Practically, nothing is said about the actors who make
rescaling possible or about the participants who belong to these networks. Over what kinds of issues are decisions
taken and what about land use decisions?
What do we know about the substantive interests of citizens or investors
or possible clashes between these parties? How are differences resolved? Neither structuralist nor eclectic writers pay
much attention to formal rescaling or the institutional moorings that might
help us answer these questions. The most
we can make of ongoing accounts is that territory has engendered a life and
direction of its own—reified as a thing unto itself and as an object of
intellectual faith.
We suggest that territory does have meaning. Rescaling is
not just fraught with processes, but with substantial issues and political
implications. Territorial jurisdictions, political institutions and their boundaries
cannot be swept away by conceptions of “splintered urbanism” or “galactic
cities”. The very ways in which territories are
reconfigured and can open or close political and social paths. In
doing so, they shape individual behavior and collective action. We all know that demarcated places are often commensurate with social
class. Living
in them profoundly influences life experience and social mobility (Dreier, Mollenkopf and Swanstrom, 2004). Even
very large territories like the American states
bear upon an individual’s ability to move up or down the income ladder
(Pew, 2012). Territory is power and like
power everywhere it is used to obtain access, privilege, purpose, and
instrumental ends. To be sure not all territories
hold this quality, but many do and we offer an alternative way of exploring larger
ideas about the uses to which territory has been put.
Putting Assumptions on the Line
Scratch beneath the surface of the globalization/territory linkage and serious
anomalies make it all very dubious. For one, globalization may not be the only
source for much rescaling and it may have nothing to do with some of it. As we shall see the roots of rescaling are
complex and multifaceted-- not easily explained by any single cause or
explanation. Much depends upon how
rescaling is identified, upon the places where it has been adopted and upon the
circumstances of its adoption. To say
the least, rescaling has as much to do with pressures generated from inside a
nation as it those external to it.
Second, the case that globalization
has brought on the “death of distance” also may be overstated. Small scale units are still useful and quite
resilient as witnessed by the key role of central business districts and the
longing for community. The popularity of
“new urbanism” and “neo traditional development” suggest that there may be
limits to size and the utility of networks.
Adding to the skepticism, public choice scholars find that local
jurisdictions continue to count a great deal.
Their logic is simple—localities maximize benefits by locking in
positive externalities and minimize costs by locking out negative
externalities. Territorial identity serves
the self interests of residents and by most calculations is likely to
persist. For this influential school any
and all enthusiasm is reserved for either individual consumers or small
territorial units (Ostrom, 2000). While
eclectic writers might overlay small units with new “spaces of flows”, much of this
portrayal lies at the level of abstraction and little else. In the United States and elsewhere small jurisdictions
protect their own turf, which they see as holding the real action and pay scant
attention to how they may be virtually connected to a different world.
Third, if globalization exerts the
pressures scholars claim it does, we would expect a great many cities to
rescale. Under these conditions we would
certainly see an upsurge of rescaling from the 1980s onward. While we are not aware of an empirical
investigation that hones in on this specific question, our own work suggests this
projection is not borne out (Tsukamoto and Vogel, 2007; Savitch and Vogel,
2009). At least in North America and Western Europe the pre-global period of the 1960s
witnessed a good many formal rescalings while the global era was relatively
stable.[v] Indeed, most localities have not rescaled
nor are they considering it. Rather,
they continue as independent jurisdictions either competing with neighboring
localities (United States)
or functioning as semi vassals of central government (Western Europe, Asia, Latin America). There
are also instances where regional policies so popular during the pre global
1960s were abandoned during the global eras of the 1980s and 1990s.
Fourth, if globalization engenders
rescaling we would expect the most “globalized cities” to be eager candidates
for such a change While, some of these
like London and Toronto have rescaled,
others like New York, Frankfort
and Milan have remained much the same over the last 40 years. The idea that cities would rescale in order
to facilitate the “circulation of capital” has very little basis in fact. Certainly, the signs tell us there is no
simple and clear relationship between rescaling and the requirements for the
solvency of private capital.
Fifth, if global pressures were the
overriding source of rescaling we would expect similar patterns of
response. In point of fact, there are
almost as many different forms of rescaling as there are cities that have
undertaken that action. Sometimes
structuralist and eclectic expectations are borne out. Hong Kong and its expanded linkages to the
Pearl River Delta confirm a trend toward some kind of regional governance. But at other times the exact opposite occurs
and movements have arisen to reconstitute government into smaller units. The secessionist movement in Los
Angeles is a case in point and so too is the growth of greater
localism in newly emerging cities like Buenos Aires
and Santiago (Chile).
Eclectic writers might counter this
critique by arguing that “spaces of flows” act to unify larger entities without
a need for political institutions and formal institutions ought not to serve as
the criterion by which rescaling should be judged. But we see no systematic and consistent
evidence to warrant that conclusion, and this pertains to both informal and
formal rescaling. For every unifying act, one could equally point to actions
that polarize localities and keep them apart from one another (Savitch and
Vogel, 2006; European Union, 2007; Kantor et al, 2011). The proliferation of cleavages not only holds
for political divisions, but for social, cultural and demographic separation
which appears to be growing (Putnam, 2000; Swanstrom, et al., 2004). Nor should we equate increased commutation or
communication across boundaries with social assimilation across
boundaries. If people are not joining
with one another across boundaries, it may difficult to see where the “100 Mile City” is taking
us or whether it truly exists.
Last, in the matter of theory it may
be that that structure plays an important role in re-scaling. Structures produce pressures that can have an
immense bearing on how people act. But so too do people act and make decisions
despite those pressures. The human
factor or “agency” which entails discretion, volition and circumstance should
not be underestimated. Almost every territorial change involves agency of one
kind or another—from the laying of infrastructure, to granting utility licenses
and drawing boundaries. Agency and
politics allows for multiple pressures and cross pressures to exert themselves
and loosen up structural constraints. When
it comes to reconfiguring territory, personal gain and even serendipity may
count a great deal. One cannot consider
structure without appreciating how it is changed by agency. To this we now turn.
Bringing
Agency Back In
We suggest that many of the existing accounts are
incomplete; sometimes inaccurate; and, much of the time insufficient for
explaining territorial change. The
terminology used to describe the process may not reflect reality and the
metaphors employed may be overdrawn. In
the end “things” do not make decisions, people do and people enjoy
discretionary space that can trump conditional constraints. Put differently, we need to ground
territorial rescaling in the reality of how people respond to challenges and
act upon them. As we see it, any such
explanation needs to be considered in the context of human agency. Without this
grounding the work already done on this subject loses its value.
Our approach is to inform global
theory with experience from rescalings that have taken place in advanced
societies in different parts of the world.
In a manner of speaking, we put existing interpretations under the light
of grounded empirical research. Like
many other scholars we recognize that global pressures may act upon localities,
but we also feel they do not function in a raw, direct manner or uniform
fashion. Here again local and in some
cases national politics intervene to radically accentuate or displace global
pressures. We explore how political
realities interpret, change, redirect, mediate, absorb or reject global pressures.[vi] We illustrate the critical role of
institutions and highlight that territory is not just a container for capital investment
but an arena fraught with opportunities and obstacles through which power is exercised.
The implications are clear. Human discretion
can shape territorial contours, using them to increase or lessen social
polarization; political decisions can decide the permeability of borders, exposing
or shielding the larger population to global forces; and, agency can determine
territorial size, promoting or hindering human interaction across boundaries.
In short, agency can do many things,
and we take as an assumption that nothing is necessary except that which is adopted
and nothing is ordained except that which actually takes place. It may be that rescaling will follow patterns
claimed by theorists or it may be possible they will modify them or it may be conceivable
they will reject global pressures. This
approach also enables us to fill the gaps in how territorial institutions
actually work, both politically and socially.
Keeping this in mind we offer a set
of propositions and themes. We take it as fundamental that rescaling shapes the
content of political participation in different ways (Bachrach and Baratz,
1970; March and Olsen, 1989; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). This is particularly true of formal rescaling because it entails a
high degree of organization. In a word territorial
institutions matter, and like all organizations they hold biases that tilt power
toward some people and away from others.
For this reason alone it is important to uncover how institutions affect
policy outcomes. Within these confines we also know that people make decisions
under a variety of opportunities and constraints. These can be complex and include 1) an array
of interest groups as well as holistic expressions of popular opinion through
referenda 2) the content of existing
socio-cultural or political cleavages 3) the nature of a given regime sitting
at the very locus of authority (city, region, province, nation) and 4) the
motivations and objectives of elites who exercise power.
Beginning with the first theme, most
studies show that territorial formulations are not deduced from global
imperatives but are the product of interest
groups and public opinion. Interest groups have a great deal of
influence on what is decided and whether support will be forthcoming. This is
particularly true in the United States where success depends upon how a
proposal is marketed and citizens are galvanized in support or opposition to a
given proposal (Leland and Thurmaier, 2005; Feiock and Carr, 2006). Indeed, in the United States consolidations,
the adoption of metropolitan government and even annexation are subject to
voter preferences. In France, interest
groups played a key role in how its National Assembly formulated a larger set
of elaborate territorial rescalings. Likewise
interest groups or individual citizens may uphold the existing boundaries to protect
their own advantages. This not only
holds for the United States
but is quite applicable for Latin American cities which are typically
fragmented by social class (De Mattos, 1999; Rodriguez, A, and L Winchester,
2001)
Existing sociopolitical cleavages also matter a great deal in how territory
is divided. These divisions are manifest
in informal rescaling and sometimes in formal rescaling. One way or another, socio-linguistic
differences are refracted in territory. In
Canada, interest groups were instrumental in how Montreal was formally rescaled,
allowing Anglophone boroughs to opt out of its new territorial form. In Belgium, divisions between Walloons and
Flemish people have brought about an informal rescaling of Brussels (Hepburn,
2004).
In other instances of rescaling, political regimes are one of the keys to
understanding how they come about and how they work. Indianapolis’
“Unigov” as well as Greater London’s Assembly were creatures of new regimes
that sought ways of reconfiguring metropolitan territories for narrow political
advantage (Owen 1985; Newman and Thornley; 2005). In each of these cases, higher level
governments imposed an umbrella of metropolitan governance on an area. Indeed, much the same can be said for Tokyo’s and Portland’s
rescaling, each of which was the product of a political regime (Nelson and
Moore, 1993; Vogel, n.d.).
The last factor turns on raw
power. Since people who hold power often
formulate how a territory will be rescaled, it may very well be that they are
interested in maintaining power. Our own
experience with Louisville’s
consolidation tells us that globalization had little or nothing to do with its
rescaling and much to do with enhancing the control of local elites (Savitch
and Vogel, 2004). Power considerations
also entered into the thinking of Marseille’s political elites as they decided
to lead a confederative arrangement with surrounding jurisdictions (Donzel,
1998; Baraize and Negrier,. 2001).
One commonality underlying all
themes is the ability of interest groups, regimes, elites or popular will to
carve boundaries. We can readily see
that boundaries both circumscribe and enable the exercise of power. Without boundaries power is clumsy, unwieldy
and easily undermined. With boundaries “authority” and hence “power”
achieve resonance and can be channeled toward certain ends. The
notion that authority can be concordant with territory is a relatively modern
idea which did not take root until the medieval period. With
the introduction of boundaries nobles and burghers began to set limits on each
others’ power and the “rights” of different social classes gained greater
traction (Weber, 1958; Sassen, 2006).
Quite often these boundaries were reinforced by the physical presence of
walls and other obstructions, which more clearly defined what belonged to whom.
Those prerogatives gradually evolved
and today boundaries make it feasible to set rules, muster resources, and
distribute rewards. The consequences are
palpable. The modern day problem of how positive or negative externalities can
“spillover” or “spill within” boundaries now occupies the thoughts of planners
and other scholars. Who gets the golf
courses and who gets the sewage plants say a great deal about how boundaries
draw the line between well being and distress. Here are issues of lasting importance and we
take them up in the chapters ahead.
Of course boundaries can be changed
and are sometimes unstable but this varies with type of jurisdiction. National boundaries have been very durable in
modern times; state or provincial are also fairly stable; municipal boundaries
less reliable and metropolitan boundaries are very pliable and often indistinct
(Sancton, 2010). Structuralists and
eclectic writers often ignore boundaries, but we think that may be a
mistake. Whether boundaries are formed
by networks of communication (informal rescaling) or the work people within
institutions (formal rescaling) they continue to play an important role in urban
life. .
In examining both the making of
boundaries and larger aspects of territorial changes we observe that not all
rescaling is as unicausal as the literature would suggest. As we see it, territorial changes are due to
a miscellany of motives. Sometimes a
single factor can overwhelm everything else while at other times multiple
factors may operate singularly or in tandem and become determinative. Given the plurality of experience, outcomes can
take many different forms and yield dissimilar results. Stemming from this we analyze how territorial power is acquired, the
manner in which it is used, who turns
out to win or lose, and what this
means for a rescaled area.
Grabbing Hold of Rescaling by Highlighting Diverse
Cities
Logically, we focus on the agency behind “territory and power” and the
gravitation pull of this volume is toward formal
rescaling. While it is clearly not
possible to cover a vast amount of cities, we have sought to maximize a variety
of experiences and formulate valid propositions. Our concern with territorial
institutions requires that we seek a large enough balance of cities to reflect
differences in status, geography and type of city. These cities are located in advanced
societies within North and South America, Western Europe and Asia.
We opened this chapter with a
discussion of globalization and it is also fitting that we select our urban
territories by consulting indices of globalization. One of the more comprehensive and up and up
to date surveys has been done by MasterCard Worldwide (2008). MasterCard identifies a set of 75 world
cities, ranked by seven different political, business or intellectual
indicators. Another well known survey was conducted by Global and World Cities
(GaWC) project which ranks over 250 cities by their relative standing on how
well firms within one city connect to firms in other cities around the world. By
GaWC calculations different degrees of “connectivity” reflect how thoroughly a
city may be globalized.
Our selection is geared to rank
order listings of hundred of cities within these surveys.[vii]
Sixteen cities were chosen: the most
prominent include London, New York, Hong Kong and Tokyo; those which are fairly
prominent consist of Paris, Los Angeles and Toronto; those which are important
but further down the global hierarchy are Montreal, Miami, Buenos Aires and
Vancouver; and, those which have some consequence but are located at the bottom
or outside the hierarchy comprise Marseilles, Manchester, Santiago,
Indianapolis and Louisville.
Figure 1.1 displays a map of sixteen
cities located in advanced industrial societies. Our cities are drawn from across the
globe. MasterCard and GaWC rankings are designated
for each city. The symbols designate
MasterCard by the size of the circle while GaWC is indicated by the color of
the same circle.[viii]
Figure
1.1.
Sixteen
City-Regions Ranked by MasterCard (2008)
and GaWC (2010)
These sixteen cities constitute the
heart of our discourse and we draw from their very different experiences. This broad sample makes up our data base and we
recognize its limitations as well as its advantages. Naturally, our ability to generalize are
bound by the cities at hand—all of them products of particular histories and a
“thick environment” of local practices. At the same time we also see this as a
way to capture texture and gain understanding that cannot be acquired by much
larger samples and aggregate analysis (Weber, 1958; Gerring, 2007). Our comparative emphasis presents
opportunities for prudent judgment and that enables us to make educated evaluations
about their applicability to other settings.
.
A
word should be said about style and method.
Our approach is thematic, discursive and comparative. Rather than narrations of individual cities,
we rely on a series of themes to trace the experience and consequences of urban
territorial institutions. For the most
part, the analysis is done from the perspective of the central city and its nearby
suburbs, and we refer to this composite as the “city-region”. [ix]
The standard for the “city-region is fixed by the degree to which the central
city influences and interacts with smaller jurisdictions around it. In the United States and Canada the
definition is concomitant with metropolitan areas designated by national
censuses. Similarly designated “metropolitan areas” or “metropolises” are used
for the United Kingdom, France, Argentina, Chile and Japan. Because of its special legal and functional
status Hong Kong is treated as a self contained entity (see Appendix for
definitions and data).
A
comparative study of this kind warrants a methodological underpinning. Any effort at linking institutional
characteristics to particular outcomes poses considerable challenges, and in
dealing with this we employ the conceptual tools found in a “theory of change”
(Weiss, 1995; Savitch, 2011). At a basic level the theory traces the lines between
action and result. It constitutes a way
of applying explicit propositions to a potentially transformative situation and
watches to see if the change occurs. Phrased
another way the “theory of change” focuses on the linkage between a priori theory
(expressed in this case as strategic propositions) and a posteriori
outcomes (demonstrated through case results).
The theory relies on the acuity
of general propositions to expose the results of a specific intervention. When applied to our own setting we should be
able to establish a direct connection between promise and performance, say for
example, a tangible connection between the initiation of a strong metropolitan unit
to tackle sustainable development and a newfound capacity to preserve open land
or build a waste treatment plant. [x]
If these changes do not follow from a promised
innovation, we can only assume they do not work toward their intended
direction.
Thematic and Chapter Organization
The material is organized into three
basic sections. An initial section
containing this chapter and Chapter 2 introduces the subject matter and
provides the reader with a background of the forces behind global re-scaling. Chapter 2 discusses the importance of
territory, political institutions and offers a theoretical framework for
understanding how rescaling works. A middle
section containing Chapters 3, 4 and 5 serves as a topical umbrella for
explaining the genesis and operations of rescaling. Chapter 3 deals with monocentric re-scaling
as it manifests itself in consolidation and multi tiered systems. Chapter 4 takes up very different polycentric
systems by analyzing diffuse (fragmented) systems where cities are either in
full competition with one another or partially cooperate through “linked
functions”. Chapter 5 takes an
altogether different tack by going beyond the metropolis and discussing rescaling
at regional levels. Here we examine larger
the currents of regional development and prospects for intra regional cooperation. A last section containing Chapters 6, 7 and 8
addresses the broader aspects of rescaling.
Chapter 6 deals with the role played by institutions in both initiating
and resisting change. This chapter also deals with tensions between central
versus local interests and territorial adaptations to those tensions. Chapter 7 is more applied and takes up thorny
issues about the actual impact of rescaling, namely the results it has yielded
for urban development, bureaucratic efficiency and democratic accountability. A
final chapter ties together our findings within the context of the urban future.
Here we turn on several critical issues of whether localities can realize
certain ends by territorial re-scaling, how can we best understand the effects of
rescaling and what might be its intended or unintended ramifications. Taken together these chapters offer new propositions
about the uses to which territory is put. We are able to show not only how re-scaling
works, but how it fills the social order with political meaning.
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NOTES
[i]
We define
globalization is also treated in broad terms and as a process whereby previous economic, social, cultural, and political
barriers to national interaction have become much more permeable. As a result it is accompanied by a train of
other changes, including radical deindustrialization, increased suburbanization,
neo liberal economic policies and a push for regionalizing public
policies. In this chapter we treat
globalization under these multiple rubrics.
[ii]
While these pacts are regional in nature they constitute a significant
step toward even broader international exchange. Thus the European Union has grown from a
handful of nations in Western Europe to include nations in East Europe and also
grants privileged status to nations outside Europe. Mercosur which operates in South America has
begun to expand and even includes special status to Israel. The EU has 25 members, Mercosur (Mercado
Común del Sur) is comprised
of four regular member (Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay)
and five associate members (Bolivia,
Chile, Columbia,
Ecuador and Peru). ASEAN is a loose association of governments
comprised of ten nations (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei,
Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos,
and Vietnam)
[iv] Since then and
after studying China Friedman has altered his position. He now suggests we need to pay greater
attention to internal political and cultural dynamics. As
Friedman states, “globalization as the analytical framework for the study of
cities tends to privilege outside forces to the neglect of internal visions,
historical trajectories, and endogenous capabilities. It also places emphasis on economics to the
exclusion of sociocultural and political variables. ( Friedman, 2005: xvi)
[v]
In North America some of these included Minneapolis-St. Paul (,) Jacksonville
(1967) and Nashville
( ). In Western Europe the examples are London (1964) Paris (1968) Barcelona and the Randstad
[vi] Note the term “mediate” is often
used in the literature to show how local institutions deal with
globalization. For us “mediate” is just
one factor among many, and it may be that local institutions play a much
stronger role in coping with global pressures as well as respond in multiple
ways.
[vii] Our
sixteen cities are fairly well distributed along a range of categories and
rankings. The Master Card Index uses the following criteria: legal/political
framework, economic stability, ease of doing business, financial flows,
business centers, knowledge creation and livability. Using quintiles our sixteen cities are
positioned as follows: first quintile (London, New York, Hong Kong, Tokyo and
Paris) second quintile (Los Angeles and Miami) third quintile (Montreal and
Vancouver) fourth quintile (Santiago)
fifth quintile (Buenos Aires) and not ranked (Manchester, Marseille, Indianapolis and Louisville). The GaWC index measures globalization more
directly by employing a quantitative measures of connectivity whereby cities
are ranked as Alpha ++ Alpha + Alpha, Alpha – Beta +, Beta -, Gamma +, Gamma,
Gamma -, High Sufficiency and Sufficiency. Our cities rank as follows: Alpha ++ (London
and New York) Alpha+ (Hong Kong, Tokyo and Paris) Alpha (Toronto and Buenos
Aires) Alpha – (Los Angeles and Santiago) Beta- (Miami) Gamma+ (Montreal and
Vancouver) Gamma-(Manchester) High Sufficiency (Indianapolis) and Not Ranked
(Marseille and Louisville)
[viii]
Both MasterCard and GaWC
use central cities to compose rankings.
[ix] Our designation of the
city-region is drawn from a previous work on the subject where we referred to
this as the “functional city” (Savitch and Vogel, 1996).
[x] Its roots as an evaluation tool
are well established and the theory has been employed to assess a wide range of
federal programs, most heavily in urban development (Abt Associates, 1997;
Connell and Kubisch, 1998)
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