H.V. Savitch
Doddy Iskandar
and
Charles Kaye-Essien.
University of Louisville
A
Strategy for Declining Cities
Much of the
urban development literature addresses failures in formulating and implementing
strategy. This observation is especially true for cities that are considered to
be in a state of “decline”. In the
United States, a generation of literature during the 1960s and 1970s portrayed
urban development as top-down and heavy handed (Gans, 1962; Anderson, 1964;
Goodman, 1971). Other case studies
continued to see the results of redevelopment as disastrous for cities (Thomas,
1997; Keating, Krumhoz and Perry, 1995).
This article
takes a city that has reversed decline and elucidates the strategic elements
that led to its success. Perforce these
are “big picture” items, embracing multiple dimensions of urban decline like
the condition of the built environment, creating employment and providing
housing. Accordingly the questions turn
on 1) what are the elements that can
be found in such a strategy? 2) why
might such a strategy be plausible? and 3) whether
such a strategy has made a significant difference? There is also an important
normative question we consider at the conclusion of this piece namely, 4) how does such a strategy of re-growth
address questions of equity?
The locus of
this study is in Europe, where some cities have experienced severe distress of
de-industrialization. While declining cities in Europe may differ from similar
cities in the United States they all share common predicaments. Examining the American experience through a
distant lens holds the potential for yielding fresh insights and provides
useful lessons into those predicaments.
Thinking of Marseille as a “Critical Event”
The distant lens
used here is Marseille, France roughly embracing the period from 1970 to 2012. In important ways Marseille embodies a
“critical event”, defined here as a sharp break in an expected pattern coupled
to the establishment of a new pattern of activity, behavior or physical
change. As such this occurrence might
also be seen as a landmark in the history of urban development. In experiencing
this “critical event” Marseille’s long path into decline can be traced through
a strong, seemingly inexorable trend line. Conversely, its return has been
abrupt––even remarkable––and coincides with a distinct policy
intervention.
A Profile of Decline and Reversal
Marseille is
France’s second great metropolis. An old port city with a colorful history,
Marseille has also been ridden with severe problems. It holds a large number of
blue collar families; it is home to a significant number of poor immigrants;
and it suffers from a substandard educational system. We are also dealing with
a city that rose to greatness in the late 19th/early 20th centuries
and whose time seemed to have passed. In a way the very problems confronted by
this city holds advantages for researchers, because if Marseille can return we
might assume that many other cities are capable of recovering.
Marseille’s
decline can be traced back to the period roughly between the mid1970s up
through the mid1990s. Like many other
notable industrial and port cities in Europe and the United States,
de-industrialization had shorn Marseille of its once vibrant factories and port
facilities. As illustrated in Figure 1, the city’s population which peaked in
1975 with a total of 908,600 residents had entered a spiral of decline. By 1998 it reached a low figure of 798,430
residents. Manufacturing jobs which accounted for 27 percent of the city’s
workforce during the 1950s and 1960s, had plunged to just 19 percent by 1975
(Dell Umbria, 2012). Among the first
factories to go were soap, oil and food processing plants. Assembly plants and light manufacture soon
followed the trend of exiting the city for cheaper and more efficient
locations. These incidents
amounted to a loss of more than 100,000 residents and 50,000 jobs out of a base
of more than 350,000 (INSEE, December 2002: 18). Particularly hard hit were
blue collar jobs which fell by 39 percent. Even Marseille’s tertiary sector
lost a quarter of its job base (Donzel, 1998:74; Savitch and Kantor, 2002: 65).
At the same time poverty and unemployment rates reached or exceeded 20 percent
(INSEE, July 2002; 18-19; Savitch and Kantor, 2002: 318). By the 1990s
Marseille was left with just 6 percent of the region’s economic activity.
Nearby cities like Aix-en-Provence and Nice had absorbed the bulk of new growth
in tourism, services and high technology. Smaller cities around Marseille attracted
heavier industry and were strong competitors for scarce capital.
A significant
part of the city’s decline centered on its well-known harbor. The conversion to
large ships and containerization rendered Marseille’s shipping obsolete; made
tangible by the departure into modern facilities at the other end of the
region. The bulk of containers and shipments moved to Fos-sur-Mer, 31 miles northwest
of Marseille. By the 1990s the industrial wharves were quiet with just a few
hundred hands at work (Donzel, 1990: 289). The downtown area, the docks, the
waterfront at the foot of La Cannebière and adjacent neighborhoods had begun to
show signs of decay. Neighborhoods near the heart of the city were marked by
vacant buildings, dingy streets and broken infrastructure.
These fairly
bleak conditions in Marseille however began to visibly change during the early
years of 2000. For the first time in
decades population began to increase in 2000 and by 2010 the population had
reached 851,420 increasing by 5.1%. Much
of this is indicated in Figure 1 which provides us with a chronological picture
of Marseille’s demography. As the line graph shows, Marseille appeared to
prosper up through the mid-1970s. But
just as quickly as people moved into the city, they exited it. By the 1980s the size of the city’s
population was in full retreat and it only began its upward trajectory after
the year 2000.
Figure
1: Trend of Population Growth
Source: Author’s Construct
based on data from INSEE websites:
- http://www.recensement-1999.insee.fr/default.asp?asp_action=produit&c_typeprod=DDS&c_prod=R_MRP&c_theme=IMG&c_codgeo=13055&c_nivgeo=C
- http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau_local.asp?ref_id=POP&millesime=2010&nivgeo=COM&codgeo=13055
Accessed on October 27, 2013
The resurgence
of population generated re-growth in commerce. As the city moved into the 21st millennium business creations
were on the upswing, rising at an annual rate of 15 percent by the middle of
the decade. Jobs followed in the wake of improvement with an annual increase of
1.4 percent (INSEE, 2009: 4). While unemployment was still high, it had declined
from 96,618 persons in 2000 to 62,827 in 2008; dropping by a quarter of the
previous decade’s total (AGAM, June 2005).
The statistical
growth also showed up in a visual change. The downtown area turned brighter
with restored buildings and new shops. Banks, department stores, hotels and
corporate headquarters filled once empty spaces. More pedestrians and shoppers appeared
on the streets. At the very base of the downtown, the waterfront took on a life
of its own. Marseille’s famous harbor bustled with large excursion vessels,
pleasure crafts, small fishing boats and an occasional barge. Today the city’s
downtown/waterfront area radiates with prosperity, making for an unusual
combination of commercial vitality and Mediterranean leisure.
High Impact, Crucial Area Development (HICAD)
Marseille’s path to change was triggered by the development of an area or
zone situated near its port facilities called
EuroMéditerranée (EuroMed). As
illustrated in figure 2, Euromed covers a total area of 480
hectares located within neighborhoods (arrondisements)
I, II, III VII, XII, XIV, XV and XVI. These eight neighborhoods are situated
within a total area of 49.15 km2.[1]
With a population density of 7,960 people/km2, it is the most populated area
within Marseille (AGAM, 2012).
Figures 2 and 3 display the geography of
Marseille, its neighborhoods and the EuroMed project. Figure 2 offers a broad view of the city and
its sixteen distinct neighborhoods. The EuroMed areas are shaded in grey and
shown in relationship to the rest of the city.
Figure 3 takes a closer view of the EuroMed and the key neighborhoods in
which it is situated. This figure also shows the initial 311 acres developed between 1995
and 2007 along with five neighborhoods designated for redevelopment beyond
2008. The
targeted proximate neighborhoods are within a core area of waterfront, docks
and commerce––Arenc, La Joliette, Rue de
la République, La Belle de Mai, and Saint
Charles.
Figure 2: Map of Marseille, Its
Neighborhoods and the EuroMed Area
Source: adapted
from Agence d’Urbanisme de l’Agglomération Marseillaise (AGAM), 2012;
Euroméditerranée & Etablissement Public d’Aménagement EuroMéditerranée,
2008
Figure 3: The EuroMed Area
Source: Adapted
from Etablissement Public d’Aménagement EuroMéditerranée, 2008
All told, the EuroMed
area encompassed 28,700 people living in 14,500 housing units, half of which
were built before 1915 (EuroMéditerranée, 2000:3; Dubois, Douay, Da Silva,
2007: 26). Notice the locations of these neighborhoods as they roughly embrace
the area around the ports and docks (Cite de la Méditerrané). Also seen in the
map is the proximity of this development to the centers of Marseille such as
the Old Port (Vieux Port), the principal avenue (La Canebière), the rail
station (St. Charles) and the stock exchange (Centre Bourse).
In
terms of administration, Euromed was established as a public corporation in
1995 by the national government to operate outside bureaucratic channels. To accomplish this EuroMed was granted
generous financing and a good deal of leeway. While the organization is
overseen by a 20 member board of directors, its staff is quite small and
limited by statute to just 30 individuals.
It began with a budget of 1.7 billion francs ($259 million) and its
progenitors made sure it would reflect a partnership between all levels of
government (State, city, metropolis). As
of 2012 EuroMed had invested a total of €722 million derived from both
public and private sources ($983 million).
These funds were applied to creating a mix of new or renovated docks,
office towers, housing and replacing infrastructure and open space.
EuroMed’s
multilateral partnership was more than just a matter of cost sharing, but a
mechanism to engage important actors at all levels of the political
establishment. By itself EuroMed could
not do the job. Without a multilevel
consensus the organization’s objectives would languish, but with it popular
consent could be mobilized around difficult issues of land clearance and
housing. This small, well financed
organization was backed by a State declaration that made EuroMed an “operation
of national interest” (Dubois, Douay, Da Silva, 2007: 7). The intention of treating EuroMed as high priority
was clear and unmistakable, but it was one matter to make a declaration and
another matter to assure its implementation. The foundation for success would
depend upon an effective strategy.
That strategy
might evolve over time, but it began with an explicit geostrategic orientation.
The orientation focused on applying maximum pressure within a limited crucial
space––hence our designation of it as High
Impact, Crucial Area Development (HICAD). We might better grasp HICAD by
abstracting the principles that underlay EuroMed’s behavior as manifested over
a fifteen year period. That experience can be summarized in five basic propositions explained in the
following pages.
•
Frame Marseille
in multiple hegemonic roles: that is, as a great national city connected to
other French cities; as a great Mediterranean seaport leading southern Europe
and North Africa; and, as a great global city connected to other continents.
•
Apply high
resources within a well defined decisive space to achieve diversity and amplify
its effect by setting off a chain reaction of rejuvenation.
•
Connect crucial
areas of the city to one another by beginning at the waterfront (docks) and
linking these areas to Marseille’s principal downtown streets through
transportation oriented development.
•
Build upon
success by making development very visible, highly legible and characterized by
clear results.
Frame
Marseille in Multiple Hegemonic Roles.
These days
“place marketing” or “rebranding” a city is hardly new. Marseille’s efforts are unusual because of
the credence, intensity and effectiveness of its campaign. Even the organization that is designed to
spearhead Marseille’s revival takes the prefix “Euro” to signify its connection
to the fortunes of continents rather than a single nation. Marseille takes the
position that it is the lead city in the “Mediterranean arc”. On its western and eastern flanks sit the
port cities of Barcelona and Genoa; on the rim of North Africa are port cities
like Algiers, Tunis and Alexandria; and on the eastern flank of the Mediterranean
Sea we find Athens, Haifa and Beirut.
Marseille is the largest port city within this conglomeration and
France’s entrée into this part of the world.
All this gives Marseille’s claim validity and makes it very real.
At EuroMed the
thought pattern is based on relating a relatively small space to something much
larger. Marseille is seen as the
transaction city for a major port at Fos-sur-Mer (a distance of 50 kilometers
or 31 miles) as the focal point for an air hub at Marignane (a distance of 19
kilometers or 11 miles) and as headquarters for manufacturing plants at
Aubagne (a distance of 16 kilometers or
10 miles) . At another level, Marseille
is regarded as the gateway to France’s other major cities (Paris, Lyon, and
Toulouse) and the key to leading cities in Western Europe (Milan, Zurich,
Brussels). Officials are often fixed on
how Marseille compares to other cities on major indices of “globalization” and
“internationalization” (EuroMéditerranée, June, 2008; EuroMéditerranée, March,
2009). All this counts, not only for
marketing but imparts a robust message in how development is conceived.
International
standing also counts a great deal in how high officials and planners establish
their priorities. Indeed, EuroMed was
designed to draw a major part of its private investment from abroad. During its startup years nations in the West
like the United States were viewed as big potential investors. More recently China and India are seen as
sources of funding. For this reason
alone Marseille’s takes great care in cultivating an international
reputation. In 2003 France’s national
agency for development (DATAR) published rankings for the top European
cities. Marseille attained a
disappointing 23rd place out of 180 listed, and thereafter put
itself into high gear to change its standing. “The judgment (of Marseille) is
severe”, exclaimed one leader, “but it deserves our hardest efforts, without
any let-up and it is an opportunity to redress our weakness” (Donzel: 2009:
17). Five years later the city devoted
its energy to lobbying for the title of “Culture Capital of Europe”. This time it succeeded, demonstrating that it
could mobilize its resources in order to bolster its international status. We
might understand these actions, not as marketing fluff but as expectations for
acting upon the city’s future.
Apply High Resources within a Well
Defined, Decisive Space.
Marseille’s
development strategy can be likened to ju-jitsu, based on the twin strands of
pressure and place. The idea is to apply
a great deal of pressure within a small place in order to produce amplified
results. In much the same way that
focused pressure on a critical anatomical spot can make human bodies turn
around, so too can focused pressure on a crucial space turn a city around.
Planning in many
French cities is shaped by extensive public consultation, which played a part
in remaking the area. As a result the community incurred relatively little
disruption. By the time clearance was
completed barely 100 households were moved and they were given guarantees of
future housing in the area. While
national regulations called for 20 percent of housing to be set aside for
moderate income households, EuroMed lifted the proportion to 30 percent. EuroMed planners not only sought diversity
but had fixed as one of their objectives more than twice as many residents as
jobs. All this entailed risks. At the time planners referred to EuroMed as
the “great bet”, first because they were uncertain the overall mix would
produce the right synergies; second because they were concerned the social mix
would discourage investors; third because they were apprehensive about
overbuilding office space; and, last because they entertained doubts about the
viability of pursuing an international posture.
Nevertheless, everyone pushed on because EuroMed seemed like the best
vehicle to spark Marseille’s recovery.
Connect Crucial Areas to One Another.
The
great advantage of developing proximate neighborhoods with highly valued assets
lies in their capacity to magnify the effects.
These neighborhoods also have the capacity to fill the area with people
and activities from morning until evening.
Much of this occurs through normal pedestrian uses where office workers
descend onto the streets at one time of the day, dock workers at another hour,
residents at still different times and tourists by nightfall. This healthy flow of people is facilitated
by a dense network of public roads and mass transit. Despite its congestion Marseille is an easy
city to get around by bus, rail or automobile.
The combination of pedestrian access, commuter voyages and mixed land
uses has gone a long way in allowing Marseille to breathe anew.
Most important
is travel into Marseille from afar and commutation from nearby locations.
Effective and varied transit systems allow development to not only gain a
foothold but replicate elsewhere. We should note some of the most critical
portions of the transit system appeared in approximate tandem with EuroMed’s
efforts. Thus the rail station at Saint
Charles became home to the “fast train” (TGV) in 1992, as the idea for EuroMed
was incubating. The tramway (light rail) began operations in 2007 as EuroMed
was fully underway. These are very significant carriers, whose presence gives
the HICAD strategy great potency. The “fast train” provides Marseille with an
immense capacity for long haul travel, reaching Paris in just three hours and
Brussels in five. The tramway zigzags irregularly through the city, making
stops at major centers and facilitating short, efficient trips. Where the fast
train or the tramway does not go, the metro and buses do. This system knits
Marseille together in a way that makes for easy transportation oriented
development.
The idea is to
systematically make Marseille the city through which these specialized places
conduct their business. Certainly Marseilles does not have the business cache
of Paris or the technical prowess of Toulouse, but it is gradually carving a
prominent niche for itself by magnifying its capacities––in no small manner due
to a HICAD strategy.
Build Upon Success by Making Development, Visible,
Legible with Clear Results.
In one way
Marseille is no different than most American cities which have emphasized
“bricks and mortar” development over “soft services”. For Marseille there was hardly a choice. The
city was broken–– from its very heart at the waterfront, to its infrastructure
and its housing. Within EuroMed’s perimeter 90 percent of the docks had fallen
into disuse and half the housing was built before 1915 (Personal Interview, 26
October, 2009; Dubois, Douay, Da Silva, 2007: 26). What arose in the course of
a decade was impressive. Old warehouses were refurbished, new buildings
constructed and a new, shiny tramway brought passengers to EuroMed’s doorstep
at La Joliette.
Moreover those
buildings capable of being saved were rehabilitated. What was built was carefully
fitted to human scale. Where possible planners incorporated badly needed green
space. Accordingly over 14 hectares
(34.5 acres) were turned into parkland. Within a few years an old industrial
waterfront became a clean, mixed use space for business, residents and
tourists. An important part of opening
up the sea to the public involved putting an unsightly auto route underground. Some
1.5 kilometers (0.93 miles) of highway has gone underground at a cost of €150
million.
There is another
element to the HICAD strategy that touches on the connection between clear
results and prudence. EuroMed claims it
has been careful not to overbuild or oversupply its stock of office space. As a matter of practice officials say that
no more than 40,000 square meters (430,556 square feet) are released each year
in order to ensure there are enough clients for the built spaces (Personal
Interview, 26 October, 2009) . The strategy differs markedly from the American
or British practice of overbuilding and leaving office stock vacant until
renters are found (Fainstein, 2001).
This too adds to EuroMed’s image of success and its credibility with the
public.
Assessing Results of Marseille’s Critical Event
Strictly from
observation the HICAD intervention shows a significant break in Marseille’s
earlier pattern. More than ten years
after its implementation Marseille has regained its hegemonic status; HICAD’s
high resource strategy has provided the area with a commanding proportion of
the area’s infrastructure and productive capacity; EuroMed’s coordination of
transportation investments have connected the downtown and other areas to a
revived waterfront; HICAD’s orientation toward greater legibility also has paid
off, putting the area at the forefront of tourism and corporate
attraction.
One
key factor in understanding how the HICAD intervention has revived Marseille
can be seen in the changing role of its port and the subsequent rise of its tertiary
sector. Before Euromed was initiated,
Marseille's economy was heavily dependent on its industrial port. With the introduction of “containerization”
and large cargo ships, the port lost a great deal of its traffic to a deeper,
and more accommodating port at Fos-sur-Mer.
Nevertheless, Marseille’s port still created 41,300 jobs in 2007 and
much of it has been adapted to a new economy built on tourism and travel (Entreprises
et Territoires, 2009). While the “old port” is not what it used to be, it is
alive, bustling and filled with a different kind of commerce. The newly adapted port is still a key to the
city, with an investment multiplier effect of 2 Euros to 1 for every one Euro
invested (OECD, 2012).
Euromed
is designed to accommodate the growth of the tertiary sector in a globalizing
economy. The plan was grand in scale, utilizing public-private investment to
create a growth center that was capable of stimulating a multiplicity of
different land uses. The authority planned to construct one million square
meters (10,763,910.4 square feet) of offices, two hundred thousand square
meters (2,152,782.08 square feet) of public facilities; more than eighteen
thousand new housing units, and forty hectares (98.84 acres) of green spaces
(Euromediterrannee, 2013).
These
observations are buttressed by sheer numbers. In reading these figures we
recall that EuroMed was legally put into place in 1995. Several years elapsed
before it began to function and we might fairly assume that the strategy would
show results within five to ten years—beginning roughly in 2000 and into the
following decade. Since that time the area has gained nearly 22,000 jobs,
almost halved the unemployment rate, added 35, 000 new inhabitants and built
400,000 square meters (4,305,564 square feet) of residential housing (Donzel;
2009; EuroMed; 2009, Personal Interview, 26 October, 2009). By 2010 the area
had grown into a vital neighborhood, more than doubling its population to
nearly 64,000 people.
Post-industrial
transformation is often gauged by key indicators such as (1) number of workers
in the tertiary sector, (2) median household income, (3) the number of housing
units built, and (4) the extensiveness of amenities (Savitch, 1988; Savitch and
Kantor, 2002). The impact of EuroMed spilled over into adjacent areas, in
particular neighborhoods I, II, III, VII, XIV, XV and XVI. More than one third
of Marseille's total population lived in and around the EuroMed zone. The
number of housing units built in these areas exceeded other neighborhoods in
Marseille. Half of the urban amenities, such as retail shops, restaurants, and
sport stadia, are located within and around the EuroMed area. The jobs created
in this zone accounted for 25% of total employment created in eight key neighborhoods
(AGAM, 2011). Table 1 summarizes this postindustrial transformation relative to
the Euromed project.
Table 1 Development Result in EuroMed.
Euromediteranee
|
Neighborhoods
(/arrondissements) I & VII, II&
III, XIII & XIV, XV& XVI
|
Marseille
|
|
Area (sq.
km)/(sq. mile)
|
4.80/1.85
|
49.15/ 18.97
|
241/ 93.05
|
2010
population
|
N/A
|
393,293
|
851,420
|
Median
Household Income (€ Euro) / (US$)
|
N/A
|
19,239 / 26,565
|
23,016 / 31,780
|
Number of
housing units, 2007
|
18,000
|
178,325
|
410,296
|
No. of
housing added between 2007-2009
|
N/A
|
1,848
|
3,085
|
Employment
created as of 2007
|
35,000
|
146,277
|
337,249
|
Employment created
between 2007-2009
|
13,098
|
39,419
|
|
Unemployment
rate per 2007
|
23.4%
|
17.7%
|
|
Percentage of
workers in tertiary sector
|
8.8%
|
11.0%
|
|
Amenities:
|
|||
1. Retail Shops
|
4,211
|
8,284
|
|
2. Supermarkets & Hypermarkets
|
46
|
98
|
|
3. Sport Stadiums
|
30
|
64
|
|
4. Cinemas
|
2
|
8
|
|
5. Theaters
|
35
|
50
|
|
6. Operas
|
1
|
1
|
|
7. Museums
|
17
|
21
|
|
8. Hotel Rooms
|
2,256
|
4,395
|
Source: Agence d’Urbanisme de l’Agglomeration Marseillaise (AGAM), 2011, 2012 and EuroMed, 2013
Note:
Note:
- Euromediteranee is part of the city of Marseille's sectors 1, 2, 7 and 8. Previously, the city was divided into 16 arrondissements (neighborhoods). Only three largest cities in France (Paris, Lyon and Marseille) used municipal arrondissement to mark as the lower administrative division in the city. However, in 1987 the government decided to change the geographical division of the city from arrondissements (neighborhoods) into secteurs (sectors) in which one sector consists of two neighborhoods.
- Marseille's city center is located in the first and second sectors (arrondissement 1 & 7 and 2 & 3). Thus, it is obvious that in order to rejuvenate the city, the local authority opted to create a development perimeter, which includes not only the first and second sectors but also seventh and eighth sectors adjacent to the city center.
Evidence from table 1 indicates that by
2007 EuroMed had built 18,000 housing units. This figure was close to 10% of the
total housing units available in the neighborhoods I, II, III, VII, XIII, XIV,
XV and XVI. By 2009, more than 1,800 new housing units had been added in these
neighborhoods, together representing almost 60 percent of total new housing
units built in the city of Marseille. As the number of housing units increased,
so did demand for urban amenities in EuroMed and adjacent areas. A total of
4,211 retail shops and 2,256 hotel rooms beside supermarkets, sports stadia,
cinemas, theatres and museums were built in these areas. In terms of employment
creation, EuroMed added 35,000 new jobs which constituted more than 10% of
total employment created in Marseille. Out of this figure 8.8% percent were
workers employed within the tertiary sector.
Office construction has also seen a
sharp rise since EuroMed’s intervention. Figures 4 shows
the evolution of office construction in EuroMed between the 1990s and
after 2000. The bars show accumulated
office stock in each particular year. During
the initial period of intervention the average yearly increase amounted to just
833 square meters annually (8,966 square feet); during its mid phase that
number jumped to over 24,143 square meters annually (259,873 square feet); and
in the latter phase leapt to 39,286 square meters annually (422,870 square
feet). As indicated almost all of this
office space is taken up with little turnover or long term vacancy. Translated
into the world of bricks and mortar this means the EuroMed area added the
equivalent of one ten story office building per year, which soon filled
up.
Figure
4: Office Construction in EuroMed: 1994-2012
Source: Agence
d’Urbanisme de l’Agglomération Marseillaise, « Les Demandes des
Bureaux » Euroméditerranée, (AGAM),
2012,2010
These positive achievements of EuroMed
were however not without shortcomings.
As indicated in Table 1, whilst the median household income for the
whole of Marseille stood at €23,016 in 2010, that of EuroMed, was €19,239. The
percentage of tertiary sector workers also showed a 2.9% lead by Marseille over
that of Euromed (8.8%). Yet again, unemployment (23.4%) remained higher than
the city’s unemployment rate of 17.7%. These figures indicated a relatively
worse off situation within the EuroMed zone as compared to the larger
metropolitan area.
It is worth knowing however that these
neighborhoods were already in a distressed state long before the EuroMed
project. We could then say that though on
the whole EuroMed created new jobs and stimulated new development, not every
resident benefitted directly from its investments.
Economic Restructuring and
Post-Industrial Transformation
Whatever
might be said of the HICAD experience in Marseille, it has been
transformative. The EuroMed Area was
brought back from the brink and HICAD appears to have played a major role in
its recovery. After more than ten years of implementation, Euromed started to
change Marseille's economic structure. The service sector gradually replaced
manufacturing industries as the economic driver of the city. Between 1975 and
1999, 66 percent of workers in Marseille held jobs in the service sector
(INSEE, 2002). As at 2010 this number had risen to more than 95%. In the advanced
services the proportion of workers increased from 13.1% in 1999 to 18% in 2009
(INSEE, 2011). At the same time, the number of workers in primary and secondary
sectors dropped almost five percent (INSEE, 2012). Since 2000 7,200 new businesses
have been established in Marseille. In
2010 the industrial port in Marseille was ranked 41st in the world and the
fifth busiest port in Europe. This helped raise Marseille’s status to the most
dynamic large city in France (World Port Ranking, 2010).
Another
indication of Marseille’s new economy is the number of students enrolled in
colleges and universities. In his study, Romer (1989) posits that education
indirectly contributes to economic growth. Florida (2005, 2002) pushes Romer's
thesis further by arguing that the number of college graduates is one of local
economic growth's determinants. A similar argument can also be applied in
Marseille. If Romer’s and Florida’s
theses hold up, we can point to explosive enrollment numbers at the Aix-Marseille
University. By 2012 the university had
achieved a peak enrollment of more than 70,000 students. At the same time its financial endowment
reached more than €650 million (Aix-Marseille University, 2013; Ministry of
Education and Research, 2012). As of the
current decade this institution is the largest university in the
French-speaking world.
As
already illustrated in table 1, another impact of EuroMed is the mushrooming of
urban amenities in Marseille. Almost half of Marseille's urban amenities including
hotels, supermarkets, stadia and museums are in the EuroMed area. These
amenities cater to new white-collar workers as well as college students, who
comprise 13% of Marseille's total population (AGAM, 2011). Part
of these amenities also consist of the replacement of old dilapidated
structures––lacking in private bath and toilet facilities––with new, fully
equipped housing units. Since 2007 many
of these housing units have been built in the EuroMed area. Figure 5
illustrates the change in the spatial distribution of housing development in
Marseille between 1999 and 2009. Notice that the development trajectory
indicated by the number of housing built gradually moved from suburbs in the
south to the EuroMed and adjacent areas.
Figure 5. Average Number of Housing
units Built per year
Change Drivers: Post Industrial Transformation, the HICAD
Strategy and the Immigration Factor
Post Industrial Transformation
The
HICAD experience so far has brought post-industrial transformative changes to
Marseille. Marseille has been brought
back from the brink and HICAD appears to have played a major role in its
recovery. As an economic, social and cultural development project, EuroMed has
helped make Marseille an attractive and influential city. This has been brought
to a head with Marseille’s designation as the 2013 European Cultural Capital.
A
new neighborhood has been built within Marseille that respects the principles
of sustainable development and environmental protection. A new infrastructure including offices, homes,
shops, hotels, cultural and recreational facilities have been constructed and
yet still some are under construction or renovation. In essence, the city of
Marseille has become a fashionable destination.
Along
with the transformation of its economy Marseille has also experienced some
demographic recovery.. Figure 6 compares Marseille’s population growth with
other de-industrialized cities in Europe and the United States. These cities include a diversity of locations ranging
from inland cities like Detroit, Manchester, and Leipzig to another coastal port
city like Liverpool. The figure covers more than a half century of population
change that begins in 1950 and goes up to the current period.
Figure 6. Marseille’s Growth in Relation to Other Industrial Cities
Source: Author’s Construct based data from: 1) Oswalt P.
2004. Shrinking Cities, Working Papers. Detroit--No.III. and 2) INSEE website:
- http://www.recensement-1999.insee.fr/default.asp?asp_action=produit&c_typeprod=DDS&c_prod=R_MRP&c_theme=IMG&c_codgeo=13055&c_nivgeo=C
- http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau_local.asp?ref_id=POP&millesime=2010&nivgeo=COM&codgeo=13055
Accessed on 27 October 2013
Note
that Marseille has done reasonably well compared to its de-industrialized
counterparts. During the last decade, between
2000 and 2010, Marseille’s recovery was stronger than that of Detroit (USA),
Manchester and Liverpool (UK) and Leipzig and Halle (Germany). It is worth emphasizing that Marseille’s
demographic recovery has been squeezed into just a decade, coinciding with the
advent of EuroMED.
The HICAD Strategy
HICAD shows how
effectively national commitment can be wedded to a local effort. The EuroMed project started as a project of
international scope. Birthed at the governmental level during at the same time
as Barcelona’s effort to claim international stature, EuroMed was designated by
the French State as an “Operation of National Importance.”(Euromediterrane 2013).[2]
Much of this
commitment has been based on intergovernmental cooperation. A coalition of different local governments took
the lead in implementing the project.
This included agencies at the national level (the French State); other
institutions at the regional level (Bouches du Rhone and the Provence Alpes
Cote d'Azur Region) agencies at the Greater Metropolitan level (Marseille
Provence Metropolitan Urban Community) and the municipality of Marseille. The nature
of the coalition was led by the State using a combination of carrots (increased
aid) or sticks (denial of favors) in order to induce “cooperation. More importantly, the State’s financial
commitment offered little choice but to “succeed”. Initial success would beget subsequent success
and to achieve this government at all
levels employed powerful catalysts---ample funding to guarantee tangible
outcomes, a small agency capable of
sidestepping red tape and realistic, achievable planning.
The
Role of Immigration
Immigration
has for a long time influenced the social dynamics of France. As early as the
twentieth century, France already had more than a million immigrants
constituting nearly 3% of its population (INSEE, 2005). This long immigration
tradition has been borne due to fertility decline, granting of asylum to a
number of foreign refugees and cross border circulation of professionals.
The
port region of Provence -Alpes -Côte d'Azur (PACA) in general has, always been
a receptor. Beside Ile-de- France (17.6%) and Alsace (10.4%), PACA’s migrant
population as of 2009 represented 9.9% (482,800) of the Regional population.
Because of the geographical position as a seaport, PACA’s biggest city
Marseille has always been the point of convergence especially for migrants
particularly from the Mediterranean region. The trend of migrant population as
indicated in figure 7, generally oscillates between periods of growth and
declines. For instance whilst the immigrant population increased between 1982
and 1990 by 36%, it decreased by 9.7% and 19.2% within the 1990-1999 and 1999-2010
periods respectively.
Figure 7. Trend of Immigrant
Population
Source: Author’s Construct
based on data from INSEE websites:
- http://www.recensement-1999.insee.fr/default.asp?asp_action=produit&c_typeprod=DDS&c_prod=R_MRP&c_theme=IMG&c_codgeo=13055&c_nivgeo=C
- http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau_local.asp?ref_id=POP&millesime=2010&nivgeo=COM&codgeo=13055
- http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau_local.asp?ref_id=IMG1A&millesime=2010&niveau=1&nivgeo=COM&codgeo=13055
Accessed on 27 October 2013
The
make-up of the immigrant population has generally been diverse over the years
though certain groups maintain dominance. At the end of the 19th century
Italian immigrants dominated the migration: this was partly due to proximity,
economic relations and a common history between Marseille and Italy (EFILWC,
2007). The period after the First World War provided an avenue for more
immigrants especially from Eastern Europe. Within this bulk of immigrant group
included over 60,000 Armenians and 20,000 Greeks (Moore, 2011). After the
Second World War, a new wave of migration followed consisting of Jewish
refugees from Germany and other migrants from Spain. Between the 1960-1970, the
decolonization of North Africa marked the arrival of 150,000 pieds noirs, French settlers from
Algeria. As of 2010, immigrants from the Maghreb constituted the most
significant migrant community amounting to 51.8% out of the 109,870 immigrants.
As illustrated in the figure 35.4% of this total consists of Algerian-born
immigrants. The areas around the Belsunce and the Canebiere were particularly a
central trading point for these trading Algerian immigrants. Figure 8 shows this immigrant flow by country
of national origin.
Figure 8: Immigrant Population
Figures by Nationality
Source: Author’s Construct
based on data from INSEE websites:
- http://www.recensement-1999.insee.fr/default.asp?asp_action=produit&c_typeprod=DDS&c_prod=R_MRP&c_theme=IMG&c_codgeo=13055&c_nivgeo=C
- http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau_local.asp?ref_id=POP&millesime=2010&nivgeo=COM&codgeo=13055
- http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau_local.asp?ref_id=IMG1A&millesime=2010&niveau=1&nivgeo=COM&codgeo=13055
Accessed on 27 October 2013
Studies
on the impact of immigration indicate a positive contribution to both local and
national economic growth. Immigrants are supposed to impact factors such as
GDP, taxes, housing markets, consumption patterns, government expenditures, and
productivity. A recent study on the Influence of Immigrants on Trade
Diversification in the Saskatchewan Province (Canada) supports the claim that
immigrants stimulate economic growth and that trade rises with ethnic diversity
(Parkouda, 2013).[3]
However,
our cursory data Marseille does not confirm this proposition. We detect no correlation between the rate of
immigration and Marseille’s rise from the brink. For example, by 2007 Marseille’s unemployment dropped
to 17.7% (down by more than 5 % since the 1980s), though this decline did not
translate into more immigrants. Indeed, most immigrants coming to France
avoided Marseille and sought other cities such as Lyon. Quite revealing is the contrast between French
natives and the immigrant population. On
average and for the most recent period, unemployment among immigrants reached
54.3 percent--- nearly five times higher than French born residents (Zhu,
2010). Again, this is a provisional
finding based on a hint of data, and we find that immigrants have largely, been
left out of Marseille’s rejuvenation.
Conclusions in a Normative Context
From the look of
things, one can hardly doubt the physical and economic improvements that have
taken place in Marseille over the past 15 years. The adoption of a HICAD strategy of
re-growth has brought back densities, increased employment, promoted new
business and rebuilt Marseille’s infrastructure. The changes are especially palpable along the
old port, parts of the downtown and neighborhoods along the sea. A brand new
tramway now runs diagonally through the downtown, intersecting with rail, bus
and a high speed national railway system. Much of this change has occurred in
tandem with EuroMed or indirectly prompted by EuroMed or directly due to EuroMed.
Still, not
everybody has been satisfied with this transformation and some have assailed
it. A recent article by Alessi Dell
Umbria laments the passing of the old Marseille. Tellingly titled “The Sinking of Marseille” Dell
Umbria complains that the port has fallen into deep decline (p. 80); she protests
against the few skyscrapers that now dot the downtown; she objects to the city’s emphasis on
commercial-service firms; and, she bemoans that the “sea front has been turned
into a non-place” (pp. 83-84). The
author also points to a study casting doubt on Marseille’s redevelopment and
laments Marseille’s loss of civic culture and citizens being turned into
“passive consumers” (p. 83).
To make these
allegations Dell Umbria uses little or no data and the bits of data that are
mentioned are highly selective. While the author is entitled to her own
opinions, facts can be stubborn things and the facts on the ground belie her
claims. Thus, Dell Umbria uses a 1999
study to cast doubt on a redevelopment that had not yet begun; she fails to
tell the reader that decline had begun well before EuroMed began operations;
and, she never mentioned that modernized shipping required a deep water port
that could only be found outside the city.[4]
Above all we
should recognize that successful cities transform as economies change. The most resilient cities have always been made,
unmade and remade. Marseille is no
different and any successful strategy must be able to keep what is valuable, adapt
to changing conditions and, when possible, convert old uses to new ones. Like it or not, the dictates of modernity
tell us that cities are not able to stay still for very long.
Still and all
redevelopment should not be devoid of critical normative judgments. One might very well, and convincingly, point
out that Marseille’s redevelopment has led to unequal results. Optimally re-development should not only produce
visible improvements and impressive raw numbers, but also achieve some measure of
equity. Marseille is no exception to the difficulties posed by coupling
neighborhood revitalization to issues of equity, and it behooves us to take
that into account. Certainly HICAD
brought a neighborhood back to life and its benefits accrued to commuters,
newcomers and some people who live in the area.
Nevertheless, the advantages for the poorest households outside the
EuroMed Zone and in northern neighborhoods were nonexistent or marginal. Further complicating the issue, HICAD
requires a mix of public and private capital and its success has precipitated
an influx of private investment. During
recent years the ratio of private to public investment has steadily climbed and
has now reached 4 to one (Personal Interview, 28 October 2009). Should this ratio steepen, the balance of
fiscal forces could well upset the political will necessary for equitable development.
We should not,
however, allow the imperfect to dismiss the good that has come to the larger
community. Choices over development are
not always easy because they are ridden by tension between achieving real
success and distributing its benefits.
HICAD did bring about new jobs, new housing and a refreshingly new
environment, albeit within a limited scope of benefits. From this viewpoint, a strategy that works to
transform an eyesore and help local residents is a good thing. In this sense HICAD was Pareto optimal –– it
helped some but left others no worse off than they had been before.
Another matter
concerns the possible alternatives that declining cities face relative to
re-growth. Here we find there are circumstances when a HICAD type of re-growth
is necessary for revitalization. Without re-growth Marseille would not be as
desirable an environment as it is today.
Without re-growth other cities facing decline would fall short on
services, on public amenities and face cycles of more disintegrative decline. The disintegration of these local economies
not only causes hardships for local residents, but forces hard struck cities to
offer more supply side concessions to private employers (Rubin, 1987). This causes further inequities because less
well off residents find themselves subsidizing wealthier businesses. A case can be made that even if the benefits
are unequal, a Pareto optimal solution is more equitable than available
alternatives.
Besides this,
cities depend on high densities of people and industry for their energy,
creativity and competitive edge.
Disintegrative decline threatens the mainstays of city life by breaking
up its most vital clusters. The
consequent smothering of activity can be devastating for innovation, diversity
and social life. For cities with the
potential to re-grow, the absence of opportunity harms everyone and benefits no
one. After all is said and done, we might
ask ourselves, is Marseille better off today than it was in the late 1980s? Our findings tell us the answer is affirmative––both
empirically and normatively.
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[1] Marseille is divided into
sixteen municipal arrondissements.
These arrondissements serve as lower
administrative divisions in the city. The equivalent of a municipal arrondissement in U.S. cities is the
urban neighborhood. For political purposes, in 1987, the city of Marseille
enacted a law that assigned two municipal arrondissements
in Marseille into one secteur (sector).
[2]
The Barcelona Process defined a
framework of a cooperative project among Mediterranean rim countries,
particularly in the fields of security, development and culture.
[3] A
similar study has been done in the US by comparing output per worker and employment in
states that have had large immigrant inflows with data from states that have
few new foreign-born workers. Analysis so far shows that immigrants expand the
economy’s productive capacity by stimulating investment and promoting
specialization (Giovanni P., 2010).
[4]
The
port at Fos-sur-Mer and operated by the Autonomous Port of Marseille.
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