H.V. Savitch
School of Urban &
Public Affairs
University of
Louisville
Louisville, KY, USA
Workshop on Governance Issues in Megacities:
Understanding Chinese and European Examples, Center for International and
Comparative Studies, University of Zurich and Swiss Federal of Technology
(Zurich), 22 to 24 August 2011, Zurich, Switzerland.
* Adapted from
Struggling Giants: City-Region Governance in London, New York, Paris and
Tokyo by Paul Kantor, Christian Lefevre, Asato Saito, H.
V. Savitch and Andy Thornley (University of Minnesota Press, forthcoming).
Abstract
This paper draws
its findings from a soon to be published manuscript entitled Global
City Regions in Transition: The Struggle for Governability in London, New York,
Paris and Tokyo by Paul
Kantor, Christian Lefevre, Asato Saito, H. V. Savitch and Andy Thornley. I
discuss findings from this study in the light of regional governability. Three
concepts of governance are explored 1) integrated governance 2) polycentric
competition and 3) pragmatic adjustment.
I also discuss why Global City Regions (GCRs) tend to be fragmented and
the reasons for the prevalence of pragmatic adjustment. The paper concludes with an assessment of
recent accomplishments of GCRs particularly with respect to policy transfer.
Governability and Global City Regions
Life at the top of the urban
hierarchy entails a process of almost continuous social change and political
transition at the bottom. Indeed, our survey has shown how the global economic
success of global city regions is contingent on their governments helping to
make this so. It is difficult to separate the social and
economic progress of a great city region from its governmental system. Both are linked in inextricable ways. For this reason, governability matters in GCRs. It matters in how land is developed, what
gets developed, where new centres arise, how built environments are created and
who gains or loses. This pertains to areas as different as CBD cores, university
campuses and industrial poles located along the urban peripheries. Without government intervention on a regional
scale business would languish and the social stresses accompanying urban
regional development, such as access to affordable housing, would grow to
unacceptable proportions. Governability especially matters for providing in
timely fashion the critical infrastructure that integrates disparate parts of
the GCR. This network of bridges,
tunnels, highways, mass-transit systems is invariably changing across entire
regions and is constantly modernizing.
Without successful regional transportation systems, the London, New
York, Paris, and Tokyo GCRs would neither be great nor could they legitimately be called city regions.
To one extent or
another our four global city regions (GCRs) London, New York, Paris and Tokyo
are quite fragmented. This fragmentation
can be found in the multiplicity of localities that constitute each region, in
the fissions that mark their politics and in the hyperpluralsitic demographics that
make up their political cultures. Although
these GCRs may be successful as economic giants, their governance is
questionable. Questions remain about how
well their governmental systems perform the critical functions necessary for
GCRs to flourish as social and economic leaders? Even if they are presently governable,
can these political systems remain governable in the future as GCRs change and
develop during the 21st
century?
Judging “governability” is difficult,
if only because there is little consensus among academic experts or
practitioners about the meaning of this term. The concept has been debated extensively
and definitions often vary by national culture and governmental function [i].
Sometimes governability entails the issue of how well the democratic features
of a political system enable government to serve its citizens. In the USA this view is found among those who fear
too much democracy undermines good government (Crozier, Michael, Huntington,
and Watanuki, 1975 ; Yates, 1978 ).
These critics believe excessive group conflict—or hyperpluralism -- weakens government
performance and even a common sense of citizenship. In Europe and Japan, the focus
of the governability debate usually has been about preserving the role of the nation
state while encouraging governmental decentralization or legislative devolution.
In Britain and in North America the
question of governability often addresses how much governmental authorities should
rely on the private sector in carrying out public sector responsibilities (Savas, 2005 ; Wolman, and Goldsmith,1992). [ii] Others look at governability as a
matter of service delivery (Osborne
and Gaebler. 1992). Finally, governability is also viewed as “governance,”
- a process through which localities cooperate through voluntary inter local
agreements with the objective of sharing resources or undertaking mutually
beneficial regulation (Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren, 1961; Parks and Oakerson,
1989)
Concepts of Governability
Despite
lack of agreement, it is still possible to consider whether our global city
regions are “governable” or “ungovernable” without reconciling all
perspectives. Understanding the different ways political institutions may bring
about cooperation and develop policy responses within GCRs can do this. Such an approach seeks to evaluate
governability from more than one perspective; it also employs different
concepts or heuristic types to capture those perspectives. We are able to identify three different modes
or capstone concepts for achieving governability:
(1) integrated governance (2) pragmatic adjustment and (3) polycentric competition. Each concept values different organizational properties
of governmental systems and different processes in performing public
responsibilities.
Figure 1 below should
better guide out discussion. The figure
shows three concepts of governance along a continuum ranging from most to least
organized by central decision makers. In this figure, the placement of our four
GCRs along this continuum indicates that all of them fall under varying degrees
of pragmatic adjustment. For illustrative purposes, however, we provide
examples of other political entities to describe integrated governance and polycentric
competition. The discussion below begins with two very opposite capstone
concepts-- integrated governance versus polycentric competition. It is followed
by discussion of the prevailing form of governance in our GCRs, pragmatic
adjustment.
Figure 1. Types
of Governability: A Continuum
Integrated Governance
Integrated governance looks at governability in respect to how well a political system
is organized for the purpose of bringing together different centers of power in
order to achieve collective goals. This implies an integrated system of governmental
actors capable of imposing its authority and power on particularistic as well
as trans-sectoral interests by means of public policies and future visions
espoused by leadership. Although integrated governance implies the need for considerable
centralization of power in order to function, it is not always necessary to
rely on command and control devices. This kind of government can also occur if there
is widespread political agreement among interests and decision makers. For
example, such a consensus may be based on ideology, threat of an external enemy,
economic crisis or common shared political objectives. Integrated governance is
also possible by invoking incentives or sanctions on particularistic interests.
While this effort at governability has often emerged during wartime or by dictatorships,
it has also been tried by democracies in crisis (Putnam, 1996). Phillip
Selznick (1966) describes, during the Great Depression, how the head of the Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA) decisively governed a large region in the United States
by the cooptation of local leaders. The TVA carried out a centralized
comprehensive plan for bringing electricity to south-western portions of the
country in dire need of modern energy. Similarly,
Jim Bulpitt (1986) writes about central authorities in the United Kingdom,
during World War II, being able to impose their will on local government
authorities and agencies, either by coercion or by penetrating local
institutions. The ministries at
Whitehall were then able to mobilize local population within a specific
framework of public action.
By
these standards, it is doubtful that any of our four city regions could qualify
as integrated governance. In the
preceding chapters we have seen that power and authority are frequently divided
in all our global city regions, although in very different ways. This often makes
it impossible for many metropolitan wide policies to routinely emerge as
coherent planned programs. Some GCRs, such as the Tokyo region, have more integrated-style
governance than others, and in France the State assumes a special presence not
found in the London or New York regions. Yet even in Japan the central
government has not been supportive of comprehensive planning by a single
authority, and the TMG is in rivalry with scatterings of other state agencies
having specialized competencies in the central area as well as in the larger
metropolitan region. In France the central government, regional agencies and
local governments are in extensive rivalry despite the unitary character of the
general governmental order. More often than not, policy challenges linked to
global city development have not been met by integrated governmental action
unless imposed upon local governments by higher-level governments. In
particular, absence of integrated governance is most glaring on issues
involving social inequalities, including income and housing disparities, access
to jobs, environmental justice, and other matters of broad community concern. Even
on most economic policies with regional implications there is remarkably little
sustained planning supported by widespread intergovernmental collaboration. Indeed,
the failure of extensive policy integration to emerge on these issues could threaten
the sustainability of our global city regions over the long term, as discussed
below.
Polycentric Competition
An alternative way of judging
governability gives greater value to the virtues of government fragmentation.
From this perspective, fragmented governments behave as if they were in a
marketplace and compete with one another to attract residents. Polycentric Competition enables citizens and
businesses to “vote with their feet” by finding localities that offer optimal
packages of services and tax burdens. Overall, the competition is supposed to produce
more efficient services and ultimately provide a GCR with better governance. In
this framework, political “fragmentation” and even “rivalry” are not
necessarily viewed as debilitating for regional governance. Indeed, fragmentation is seen as functional
because it provides choices to citizen-consumers and forces each locality to be
more efficient. According to this
reasoning, if localities are more efficient, a healthy region will emerge. Rather than a single government exercising
control, a competitive public marketplace disciplines unworthy localities to
perform better. Representing the “public choice” school, this notion of
governability has a long tradition in the United States. Its advocates claim Polycentric
Competition is more responsive to heterogeneous citizen preferences and
therefore more democratic (Ostrom, Tiebout, Warren, 1961; Advisory Commission,
1993).
Although
this notion of governability has a convincing logic, the conditions it assumes
are rarely achieved very much in the real world (Keating, 1995). For example,
most citizens or businesses in city regions are in fact not very mobile or lack
many alternative service providers. Business and private residents also have
“sunk costs” in property, access to labor markets, social relationships and the
like. These costs often limit mobility
or the ability to “vote with one’s feet”.
Nevertheless, approximations of this model of governance are often
considered to have profound implications for urban political systems
everywhere, if only because size and scale matter in organizing and delivering
efficient public services. Studies also
show that competitive government can exact efficiencies thereby providing a
public market for those who do enjoy mobility (Savas, 1996; Osborn and Gaebler,
1992; Schneider, 1989). Again, the most common approximates of this model can
be found in the United States (St. Louis, Tampa) though South America (Buenos
Aires) also provides a source of polycentric competition.
From
this perspective, our GCRs decidedly lack governability. In none of the city regions is there extensive
and fluid economic competition between governments across a broad range of
services necessary to permit much choice for voter- consumers. In London,
Paris, and Tokyo, the local and metropolitan governments can rely on outside
sources for revenues, thereby diminishing fiscal pressures for them to engage
in economic competition. Only in the New
York region do local governments have enough fiscal autonomy to spur them to undertake
aggressive competition. But even in this GCR state governments interject themselves
in local affairs by establishing policy mandates and tax restrictions that
constrain competition. Besides, the ability of localities to engage in free-
wheeling competition is also limited by access to transportation networks and
other resources provided by agencies like the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey (PANYNJ). The autonomy that does exist allows localities to avoid shouldering
social responsibilities and is a source of extensive social segregation, thus inefficiently
concentrating the poor away from jobs and opportunities.
Pragmatic Adjustment
Another way of looking at
governability is to view GCRs as engaging in incremental local
cooperation. Using this lens, networks
of localities can produce collective policies through inter-local agreements,
coalition-building on particular issues or programs or by delegating
specialized functions to other public agencies.
Various forms of political fragmentation characterize most democratic
political systems; interest conflicts that get represented in them are often
rooted deeply in history and are difficult to reconcile. Nevertheless, public
officials sometimes find ways of pulling together despite these intergovernmental
barriers and social divisions. Moreover,
some policy responsibilities like environmental protection cannot be
efficiently provided by small-scale governments. This model assumes these services can be spun
off to special regional governmental authorities, whose scale is more
appropriate to the task. The result is a
system capable of asserting some policy direction and collective responsibility. In this case, one can argue a case for governability—even
if it is piecemeal and episodic.
If
this test is applied, all of our city regions can be considered as governable. Our
review of thirty years is essentially a story of how fragmented, overlapping
and competing governmental actors constantly struggle to achieve limited, but
significant, policy steering capability as they confront essentially similar
issues of global city development. For example, in all of our cases, public
transport is organized and successfully operated on somewhat of a regional scale.
Horizontal or vertical cooperation among public authorities that comprise the
various global city regions is commonly difficult, especially in New York,
London and Paris where power is most fragmented. Yet our analysis has shown how
programs involving multiple governments have often emerged in all three
metropolitan areas to stimulate economic modernization of local and regional
economies.
By
the same token, many social safety net programs that would strain the fiscal
and administrative capacities of city region governments are routinely handed
off to national or other higher governmental authorities. Failures of
metropolitan governments in the social realm or in environmental policy are
often compensated by the actions of higher-level authorities running national
programs. Despite their shortcomings, governments in all our GCRs managed to
relieve many social and environmental hardships. They accomplished this in varying degrees and
with mixed success. This relief could be
seen in the publicly assisted housing and green space that allow modest income
classes some respite from the hardships of urban life. Without this intervention our GCRs would be
even more polarized than they are today and far less liveable as urban
communities. To be sure our GCRs have
approached these issues differently.
London relied upon central government with a metropolitan government to
fill in vital functions, New York depended upon public benefit corporations and
bi-state authorities to patch together regional services while Paris and Tokyo
used central government and bureaucratic discretion to bridge gaps in housing,
universities and economic development.
All
of the four city regions are governmental patchworks--to a greater or lesser
degree. None is organized to be coterminous with the actual interdependent
metropolitan economy. Nevertheless, informal coordination among the various governmental
parts of our city regions permits them to realize certain common metropolitan-wide
objectives. That is why each of the city regions have increasingly turned to instruments
such as public benefit corporations (PBCs), quangos, or special administrative
agencies of one sort or another to carry out many intergovernmental functions, especially
in infrastructure development, business development, and transportation. None
of our city regions is rudderless. In fits and starts, each has been able to
mount enough sustained policy effort to measurably enhance economic
competitiveness, social cohesion, and environmental quality during thirty years.
Exactly how much effective governability each of the four city regions has obtained
in this way is difficult to assess. But their current levels have enabled them
to obtain world economic and cultural leadership, while continuing to attract
and sustain broad political support by their citizens and businesses.
Admittedly,
achieving this kind of performance offers only a moderate threshold of
political success. There are severe limitations to governability through
Pragmatic Adjustment. One limitation is
the inherent political biases in such fragmented government. Our analysis shows
how all four global city regions are more capable of pulling together for promoting
economic competitiveness than for addressing problems of social inequality or
promoting better environmental quality. Those who govern GCRs tend to place a
high priority on obtaining competitiveness in the global economic marketplace. Even
in Paris, where many local and some regional officials gave exceptional attention
to other regional objectives, their ability to shift policy away from concerns of
economic development was limited. Their priorities have been challenged by
pressures from national government and weakened by lack of resources for changing
policy direction.
Issues of regional scope,
such as cases of airport locations, commercial land use development, and other
projects considered strategic for attracting or retaining business investment
receive sustained and diffuse attention from multiple governments because
policy makers respond most easily to the threat of losing the game of global
economic competition. Although they are not organized in accord with the polycentric
competition model, fragmented governance and economic pressures at the local,
regional and international levels ensure rivalry for resources, power and
autonomy; this makes public decision makers at all governmental levels relatively
responsive to pressures of economic competition. In contrast, the absence of equally
compelling pressures to attend to the social miseries and costs of global city
development makes collaboration among multiple groups, governments, and state
agencies more difficult to sustain. This is true whether regional governance is
the most decentralized (New York), segmented (London), or moderately decentralized
in the hands of bureaucratic agencies (Paris and Tokyo). Social needs of citizens in our city regions
were addressed to varying degrees by national governments, state governments,
and by local level authorities. But these issues usually did not appear
prominently on regional or metropolitan agendas. This reality often generated conflicts
or differences in priority between levels of government, whether national,
regional metropolitan or local.
Pragmatic
Adjustment also presents problems for democracy and accountability. By relying extensively
on extra governmental mechanisms to address region-wide problems or in some
cities relying on the actions of national government, democratic participation in
metropolitan areas becomes more difficult. When responsibility for many governmental
activities is broken up and parcelled among multiple layers and kinds of public
agencies, it is difficult for voters and organized interests to assign
accountability for governmental performance. In particular, when issues spill
over the borders of particular governmental jurisdictions in the metropolis, citizen
efforts to inform policy makers or to seek changes in policy direction do not easily
materialize. They easily fail because they are difficult to organize without an
integrated and powerful political center at the metropolitan level.[iii]
For example, without
more integrated social and economic policies, the degradation of the living
conditions of some inhabitants in terms of transport access, jobs, housing and
safety has the potential to increase social and political polarization. This
can threaten mobilizing political support for policy innovation to address new
conditions. As new global economic rivals emerge, the capability of our city
regions to engage in much forward metropolitan-wide planning could undermine
their ability to adapt and remain competitive.
After everything else,
fragmented and extra governmental bodies reward short- term policy making while
discouraging long term planning. GCRs need to address a wide range of policy
issues having many different characteristics, some long term, some short term,
some with local impact, some with regional impact, and each involving different
interest considerations. The inability to draw all these dimensions together in
order to establish priorities, evaluate worthwhile policy directions, and
assess overall governmental performance discourages investing political capital
into long term planning around metropolitan-wide issues. The result: some issues
such as climate change, social polarization, and quality of life, fall into
policy voids, receiving less attention by government at the metropolitan level.
Only in Greater London since the turn of the current century does the
governmental system provide a well- organized metropolitan body with the
ability to prepare long-term strategies although limited to a particular set of
functions. Nevertheless, the GLA’s weak resources and partial geographic reach limit
its effectiveness. In London and elsewhere local governments are most often absorbed
in minor issues, such as parking offences and rubbish collection, while strategic
decision-making for the city region falls into the hands of agencies with very
limited power or is nobody’s task.
Pragmatic
Adjustment may be an inherent characteristic of most GCRs. It may not be
coincidental that all of our GCRs fall within this capstone concept. This may
well be because advanced societies are by nature complex and complexities breed
pluralism and independence on the part of power brokers, private as well as
public. As a consequence, coordination
replaces command and second best solutions are the only possibility (Kantor,
2010, Savitch 2010) in organizing complex global city regions in pluralistic
societies.
Reasons for Pragmatic Adjustment
It is no mere coincidence that we find all of
our city regions to be quite “fragmented” and varying in their “pragmatic
adjustment”. Looking back again at Figure 1 we note the
relative positions of our GCRs along a scale of pragmatic adjustment. At one end of the scale we have Tokyo Paris
and to some extent London, which are tempered by strong central governments
capable of intervening in local affairs. Each of these city regions also has an
energetic metropolitan authority (Tokyo and London) or a weak regional
authority (Paris) or a national state (Tokyo and Paris) inclined to take some
action. At the other end of the scale,
we find New York where central direction is non-existent (New York). Despite such variation, all four city regions
struggle with extensive intergovernmental rivalry and division. London is
located in a system where a strategic metropolitan authority with limited
powers has adopted robust policies but where central government is now
ideologically resistant to interfere in the “free market”. New York shows
little semblance of much regional political cooperation. New York is hampered
by federal divisions of power where it is difficult to establish a consensus
between the states of New York, New Jersey and Connecticut.
The reasons for a lack of strong central
intervention in all of our GCRs also hark back to their liberal democratic
character. Once complexity, diversity and differentiation in their regional
economies are combined with democratic features, the forces favoring persistent
political fragmentation become formidable and persistent. Regions comprised of
a multiplicity of localities have wills of their own and are able to assert
political claims and a relative degree of independence. Under these conditions
it would be surprising if our city regions were not “fragmented” and we can
expect much of this to continue. Indeed, this may be a logical consequence of
modernization.
One way of coping with
this fragmentation is to resort to extra governmental units or territorial
re-scaling in order to carry out essential policies. As mentioned above, these
units include public benefit corporations (PBCs) and quangos; GCRs also have
increasingly resorted to territorial reorganization in the form of regional or
metropolitan councils. Figure 2 shows
the extent of this territorial reorganization for three of our GCRs (London,
New York and Paris) plus a “second city” (Marseille). The horizontal row either
indicates a territorial re-organization through consolidation, multi-tiered governance
or linking functions across territory (Public Benefit Corporations).
Global City Region
|
Consolidation
|
Multi Tiered
|
Linked Functions
|
Public Benefit
Corporations
(PBCs)
|
London
|
Greater London Council (1960s) Greater London Assembly (1999) Mayor of
London
|
Southeast Regional Plan (SERPLAN)
|
London Docklands Development Corporation, QUANGOs
|
|
New York
|
NYC Consolidation, 1898
|
Tri State Planning Commission, 1960s (defunct)
|
Empire State Development Corporation (ESDC), Port Authority, 20+ PBCs
|
|
Paris
|
DATAR
Regional Council (CRIF)
Metro Pole or Greater Paris (proposed)
|
Mixed Corporation
Public Corporation
(EPAs)
(La Defense II)
|
||
Marseille
|
DATAR
Regional Council
Urban Community
|
Mixed Corporations
Public Corporations
(EPAs)
(EuroMed)
|
Figure 2. Territorial Reorganization in Select City Regions
Note the extent to which this has been carried
out. London’s 32 borough plus The City
became part of the Great London Council in the 1960s only to be disbanded in
the 1980s and a reformed metropolitan council came onto the scene in 1999. Beginning with a simple territorial
consolidation in 1898 New York has since turned to tri state cooperation in the
1960s and a host of public benefit corporations through the current
period. Paris has gone through numerous
changes beginning in the 1960s by defining its larger region (Ile-de-France)
and later through the intercession of a state agency (DATAR), a regional
council (CRIF) and most recently a proposal to create a Greater Paris
metropolis (MetroPole). Add to this
Marseille (along with other cities in France) which has adopted a metropolitan
form of government (Urban Community) and resorted to extra governmental organizations
(public authorities and mixed corporations) to carry out development.
All this reveals the extent to which GCRs have
been struggling with regional governability.
Sometimes the mechanism to achieve governability has been to enlarge
territorial jurisdictions (re-scaling) at other times central (or state)
governments have intervened and still at other times extra governmental bodies
have assumed functional policy roles.
The process by which this is done is largely incremental and relegated
to the tasks at hand (Pragmatic Adjustment) rather than comprehensive (Integrated
Governance) and even less frequently are GCRs left to their own devices (Polycentric
Competition).
Conclusions on the Future of Global City Regions
Whatever else might
be said for our city regions and however they have fallen short on social
equity, they have succeeded in many other ways—sometimes with stunning
results. Our four GCRs are knit
together through an immense infrastructure of highways, bridges, tunnels,
railways, metros, reservoirs, communications lines and more. Each day people travel throughout these
regions safely and with relative efficiency.
Finances flow, goods are manufactured, commodities delivered, and
negotiations are transacted across thousands of jurisdictions. Throughout all
of these regions the airports work, hospitals function, the courts enforce the
law and universities carry out their business. We tend to take this for granted
and it may be that pragmatic adjustment is responsible for this flexible adaptation
of governance to policy innovation.
At still another
level our four city regions carried out an amazing transition 40 years ago,
moving from predominantly manufacturing economies to knowledge, service
economies. As this transition reached
completion our city regions have pursued policies designed to enhance their
quality of life. Sports, recreation,
culture and higher education have climbed to the top of the policy agenda. Facilities ranging from stadia for
international events, to world class museums, to large research universities
now cater to a regional clientele.
Again, there are good
reasons for these innovations and herein lies the connection between pragmatic
adjustment and policy adoption. Our GCRs and especially their CBD cores need to
attract knowledge and creative workers.
Better educated citizens with higher disposable incomes also mean they
are likely to make more discrete consumer choices as well as have more to spend
on expensive goods. This not only pleases the newcomers but provides employment
for existing residents.
It
is a fair guess to conclude that quality of life and culture policies will
continue. As long as finances are
available, our city regions will continue to enhance themselves with big sports
and recreation megaprojects. They will
also favor hi tech by improving or extending wireless communication and proceed
with smart electrical grid systems.
Our
GCRs are also learning from one another by adopting policies that were
successful elsewhere. Thus, prepaid fare
cards were first used in London and Paris and later adopted in New York and
Tokyo. Another most recent example of
policy transfer can be found in Paris’ free bicycle transit system (“velo
libre” or “velib”). This is based on the
idea of storing bicycles at frequent locations throughout the city, allowing
individuals to borrow them (after paying a nominal fee) and circulating as many
bicycles to as many riders as possible.
The “velib” program has been so successful that it has now been adopted
in varying ways in New York and London (Tokyo has yet to try it).
While
these may seem like moderate, incremental steps, they have both an applied and
psychological impact. Slowly but surely
Londoners, New Yorkers, Parisians and Tokyoites have begun to appreciate their
environment, invest in common public goods and think about their regions as a
whole. The practice of adopting
policies from sister cities can only enhance this mode of thinking. It is only
fitting that great city regions learn from one another.
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NOTES
[i] See Yates,
1978; Wood, 1958; Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren, 1961; Savitch and Vogel, 1996.
[ii] In recent years, this debate has become blurred
by the immense literature on urban governance, focussing more on processes than
on substance, more on consensus building than on power, although this last
concept is staging a comeback (Lefèvre and Weir forthcoming; LeGalès, 2003;
Travers, 2005).
[iii] For this reason, current research tends to
focus on the economic efficiency of the city region while issues of democracy
within the city region receive less attention (Purcell, 2007).
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